University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 90

Issue 2

Article 4

Political Equality and First Amendment Challenges to Labor Law
Luke Taylor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Jurisprudence Commons,
Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
Luke Taylor, Political Equality and First Amendment Challenges to Labor Law, 90 U. Cin. L. Rev. ()
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact
ronald.jones@uc.edu.

Taylor: Political Equality and First Amendment Challenges to Labor Law

POLITICAL EQUALITY AND FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
TO LABOR LAW
Luke Taylor1

Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 506
II. THE STATE HAS A COMPELLING INTEREST IN REDUCING
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY’S TRANSMISSION INTO POLITICAL
INEQUALITY. ............................................................................... 512
A. Affirmative Reasons .............................................................. 512
1. Empirics .................................................................... 513
2. The Constitutional Interest ........................................ 516
3. The Interest as Understood Historically and in
Political Theory....................................................... 521
4. The Doctrinal Interest ............................................... 524
B. Prudential Concerns ............................................................. 525
1. Entrenchment Concerns ............................................ 527
2. No Limiting Principle ............................................... 534
III. UNION-STRENGTHENING LAWS ARE PLAUSIBLY ADEQUATELY
TAILORED TO THIS INTEREST. ..................................................... 536
A. Narrow Tailoring Principles ................................................ 537
1. Five Overarching Questions...................................... 537
2. Efficacy-sensitivity ................................................... 538
3. Cost-sensitivity.......................................................... 539
4. Deference to Legislatures’ Predictive Judgments ..... 541
5. Political Feasibility and the Inside-Outside
Problem ................................................................... 542
B. Causation .............................................................................. 544
1. Organizing Countervailing Political Power .............. 545
2. Advancing Economic Equality ................................. 547
C. Necessity: Why Not Just Tax and Transfer? ......................... 550
1. Progressive Tax’s Atrophy........................................ 553
2. Circuit-breaking Tax Is Likely Impossible. .............. 554
3. Circuit-breaking Tax Would Possibly Be Too
Expensive. ............................................................... 557
D. Over- and Under-inclusiveness and Proportionality ........... 559
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 559
1. Harvard Law School, J.D. I thank David Costigan, Louis Kaplow, David Kennedy, Duncan
Kennedy, Alyshia Silva, Alvin Warren, and Laura Weinrib for helpful conversations in developing this
Article. And Ben Sachs for both those conversations and his generous feedback on a draft. Thank you also
to the University of Cincinnati Law Review editors for all their help improving this Article.

505

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications,

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4

506

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

I. INTRODUCTION
It’s a hopeful time for the labor movement. The Protecting the Right to
Organize Act, which would be the labor movement’s biggest legislative
victory since 1935,2 has been passed by the House of Representatives
after receiving President Biden’s full-throated endorsement.3 Other thinkbig reforms, such as sectoral bargaining,4 are gaining mainstream
attention.5 But a countercurrent of litigation is rippling through courts in
the wake of Janus v. AFSCME.6
The Supreme Court there dealt a major blow to public sector labor
unions. But not just to these unions. Rather, Janus likely weakened these
unions’ ability to advance economic and political equality throughout the
country. And the decision’s mode of First Amendment analysis threatens
other laws that strengthen both public and private sector unions’ ability to
do so.
In Janus the Court overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,7
which had held that states could require public sector employees in
unionized workforces to pay a fee—called an agency fee—to help cover
the union’s costs of “collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment.”8 Agency fees are crucial in U.S. labor law.
Because U.S. public and private sector unions are exclusive
representatives9 of any bargaining unit10 in which a majority of
employees support the union, they bear a legal duty to fairly represent all
bargaining-unit employees—regardless of whether the employee is a
dues-paying union member. This duty imposes significant costs on the
union: costs of negotiating and administering a collective bargaining

2. See Celine McNicholas et al., Why Workers Need the Protecting the Right to Organize Act,
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.epi.org/publication/why-workers-need-thepro-act-fact-sheet/.
3. Statement by President Joe Biden on the House Taking up the PRO Act, THE WHITE HOUSE
(March 9, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/09/statementby-president-joe-biden-on-the-house-taking-up-the-pro-act/.
4. In sectoral bargaining, all firms in an economic sector would together negotiate with a union
or group of unions work conditions that bind all those firms.
5. E.g. Emily Bazelon, Why Are Workers Struggling? Because Labor Law is Broken, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 19, 2020).
6. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
7. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
8. Id. at 225–26.
9. This means only the union, not individual employees, may negotiate the employment contract
that will bind those employees.
10. A bargaining unit is a group of job classifications the occupants of which can effectively
negotiate, through a union, a common contract with an employer.
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agreement and processing grievances for all employees. This duty
simultaneously incentivizes employees to free ride—that is, to use but not
pay for the union’s services. By requiring all employees whom the union
represents to pay a fair share of the union’s expenses related to collective
bargaining and contract administration, agency fees prevent the free-rider
problem from depleting unions’ resources and rendering unions
ineffective.
A quick note about the structure of First Amendment law will be
helpful before I further discuss Janus. Put simply, the Court must find two
things to conclude that a law violates the First Amendment. First, the law
must impinge on (sometimes courts use the word ‘infringe’) the First
Amendment, i.e. restrict someone’s ability to do something that the First
Amendment protects. Second, the government must fail to show that it
needs to restrict that ability to advance a compelling (or sometimes just
important or substantial) goal.
Janus held first that—in public sector workforces—requiring
employees to pay the union an agency fee impinges on the First
Amendment. The Court reasoned that “union speech in collective
bargaining addresses” many “sensitive political topics.”11 Public sector
unions express views in collective bargaining not only on “how public
money is spent” but also “on a wide range of subjects—[including]
education, child welfare, healthcare, and minority rights . . . climate
change, the Confederacy, sexual orientation and gender identity,
evolution, and minority religions.”12 The Court concluded that because
agency fees therefore compel employees to “subsidize private speech on
matters of substantial public concern,”13 requiring these fees impinges on
the First Amendment.
The Court next concluded that neither of Illinois’s proffered state
interests in agency fees justified that impingement. Preventing employees
from free riding on the union’s services is not a compelling state interest,
the Court declared.14 Nor did the state’s interest in promoting labor peace
justify requiring agency fees. The Court assumed without deciding that
the state had a compelling interest in labor peace15—defined narrowly as
an interest in avoiding the conflict and disruption that could occur in a
workplace if multiple unions could represent that workplace’s
employees.16 But the Court concluded that abolishing agency fees would

11. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2475–76.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2460.
14. Id. at 2466–68.
15. Id. at 2465–66.
16. Id. This definition of labor peace is narrower than the labor peace concern that partly
motivated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRA sought to obviate bloody, costly strikes
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not imperil that peace.17
The principal dissent emphasized that the majority opinion disregarded
both stare decisis and the leeway First Amendment doctrine elsewhere
gives public employers to manage their workforces. But the dissent did
little to affirmatively explain the value of strong labor unions to our
democracy. Indeed, nowhere does Abood or Janus’s dissent even nod to
what many would say was the main thing at stake in these cases: labor
unions’ role in advancing economic and political equality.
Part II of this Article argues that the Court should recognize a
compelling state interest in reducing economic inequality’s transmission
into political inequality. Part III explains why various unionstrengthening laws that the Court might decide impinge on the First
Amendment—not just public sector agency fees—are quite plausibly
adequately tailored to advancing that interest, as would be required for
that interest to justify any such impingement.
After all, the Roberts Court’s trend of expanding the scope of First
Amendment impingement, combined with Janus’s reasoning and dicta,
have caused many people to fear that union-strengthening laws beyond
public sector agency fee requirements are now endangered. Already
litigants are arguing that agency fees for private sector unions violate the
First Amendment,18 despite the hurdle such challenges face in
establishing state action.19 And courts have faced a swarm of suits
alleging that public sector exclusive representation violates the First
Amendment by compelling speech and association.20 One such suit’s
that resulted from the poor working conditions that workers lacking a strong union faced. Kavitha Iyengar,
Janus v. AFSCME, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 190, n.72 (2019).
17. Id. at 2466.
18. Rizzo-Rupon v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO Dist. 141, 822 F.
App'x 49, 50 (3d Cir. 2020) (rejecting this argument).
19. Such fees almost surely do not involve state action. The NLRA merely permits (not requires)
private parties to enter into agency fee agreements. Yet Justice Kennedy seemingly implied during oral
argument that he thought this permission could satisfy the First Amendment’s state action requirement.
See Benjamin Sachs, Friedrichs and the Private Sector, ON LABOR (Jan. 14, 2016),
https://onlabor.org/friedrichs-and-the-private-sector/. A footnote in Janus cast doubt on but expressly
declined to resolve whether this mere permission constitutes state action. Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2479 & n. 24.
If the Court found state action, whether it would then find First Amendment impingement is unclear.
Private sector unions’ collective bargaining routinely addresses various of the “sensitive political topics”
that Janus noted public sector unions address. Supra text accompanying note 16. But Janus noted that
even if the First Amendment applied to private-sector agency fees, “the individual interests at stake still
differ. In the public sector, core issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues,
but that is generally not so in the private sector.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2480.
20. Courts have repeatedly concluded that these claims are foreclosed by Minnesota State Bd. for
Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984). There, the Court summarily affirmed the
constitutionality of exclusive representation, id. at 279, and further held that the state’s “meet and confer”
statute – which required state employers of unionized workforces to confer with only the union about
certain policy matters – did not restrict union non-members’ First Amendment right to speak or to
associate, id. at 289–90.
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success would likely excite similar claims against exclusive
representation in the private sector.21
Beyond casting shadow on these long-standing fixtures of U.S. labor
law, Janus’s reasoning could impede various proposed reforms for
strengthening workers’ ability to effectively organize. A Court like our
current might find that any attempt to mandate unionization22 impinges
on the First Amendment, even if that mandate were structured to merely
require collective bargaining without requiring that each worker pay or be
a member of the union.23 A more politically viable alternative to
mandatory unionization is to require workforces to opt out of, not opt into,
unionization.24 This proposal would address the oft-cited challenges faced
by workforces seeking to unionize.25 And research into how opt-out and
opt-in rules influence outcomes in other domains suggests an opt-out
regime could substantially increase unionization.26 Yet unless this opt-out
regime were shown to serve a state interest that Janus did not consider,
the Court would likely invalidate it by extending Janus’s subsidiary
Courts have rejected claims that Knight’s authority is unsettled by Janus’s dictum that
exclusive representation significantly impinges First Amendment associational freedoms. E.g. Mentele v.
Inslee, 916 F.3d 783, 788–89 (9th Cir. 2019) But at least one court warned that Janus “arguably
undermines some of [Knight’s] reasoning.” Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570, 574 (8th Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (mem.).
And courts that have reached the matter have concluded that exclusive representation would
survive heightened scrutiny even if it did impinge on the First Amendment. These decisions note that
Janus’s withholding strict scrutiny from agency fees, paired with Supreme Court compelled speech
precedent, suggests courts should review any such impingement with “exacting” – but not strict – scrutiny.
E.g. Mentele, 916 F.3d at 790 & n.3; see also Brad Baranowski, The Representative First Amendment:
Public-Sector Exclusive Representation After Janus, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2249, 2267 & n.14 (2019) (noting
compelled expression and compelled association claims receive a “heightened level of scrutiny” and
“[w]here exactly this level falls on the Court's tiers of scrutiny is murky”). Concerning the Supreme
Court’s most recent formulation of the exacting scrutiny standard, see infra note 176 and accompanying
text.
21. Such challenges could establish state action because the NLRA requires exclusive
representation. 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a). These challenges would then face the uncertainty discussed supra
note 19 concerning whether private sector union speech implicates First Amendment interests as much as
does public sector union speech.
22. For argument that law should require certain workforces be unionized, see Tristan Bird,
Representation Elections Are Incompatible with Workplace Democracy, ONLABOR (May 14, 2018),
https://www.onlabor.org/representation-elections-are-incompatible-with-workplace-democracy/.
23. Any mandatory unionization scheme would almost surely involve unions bargaining contracts
for some workers who do not want the union’s representation, and thus, at least in the public sector, by
Janus’s logic “significant[ly] impinge” First Amendment associational freedoms. Supra notes 19–20. As
a gestalt matter, judges accustomed to our present system of industrial relations might blanch at a scheme
that lets workers vote only for which union will represent them, not for whether to be unionized at all.
24. For one such proposal, see Mark Harcourt et al., A Union Default for the U.S., ONLABOR (Jul.
15, 2020), https://www.onlabor.org/a-union-default-for-the-u-s/.
25. See generally, e.g., Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to SelfOrganization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983) (discussing these challenges).
26. See Aaron Tang, Janus and the Law of Opt-Out Rights, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Jul. 2, 2018),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/janus-and-the-law-of-opt-out-rights/.
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holding that the First Amendment bars an analogous opt-out regime for
workers’ payments to unions.27
Possibly—though unlikely—Janus’s reasoning would threaten even
the sectoral bargaining28 model that policymakers and labor advocates
have increasingly recommended the United States adopt to strengthen
unions’ ability to improve workers’ conditions.29 And undoubtedly any
ban on captive audience meetings30—a ban the PRO Act includes31—
would face First Amendment challenge.32
Too much is uncertain in First Amendment doctrine to know which of
the above laws the Court would find even impinge on the Amendment.33
This Article’s focus on whether any such impingement would be justified
does not imply that such impingement exists. Any conclusion that private
sector agency fees involve state action would be startling. But the Roberts
Court’s ever-widening conception of First Amendment impingement has
treated onlookers to serial surprise. And the Court could, by extending
Janus’s reasoning, more easily find impingement in other of the above
cases.
Also unclear is whether the Court would find whatever impingement
any union-strengthening law causes to be justified by the watered-down34
and under-theorized conception of labor peace that Janus merely assumed
arguendo was a compelling interest.35
27. Janus, 138 S. Ct at 2486.
28. Supra note 4.
29. One reason challenges to private sector sectoral bargaining would be even more tenuous than
challenges to private sector exclusive representation is that the relationship between unions negotiating at
the sectoral level and workers is more attenuated than that between unions negotiating at the plant or
enterprise level and workers. The public is therefore less likely to attribute the positions that sectoral
unions espouse to any given worker – a fact that weakens compelled speech and compelled association
challenges. E.g. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994).
30. These are meetings employers require employees to attend, wherein employers or consultants
express anti-union views.
31. Supra note 2.
32. For an evaluation of such a challenge, see Elizabeth Masson, “Captive Audience” Meetings
in Union Organizing Campaigns: Free Speech or Unfair Advantage, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 169, 187–88
(2005).
33. For arguments that the Court erred in concluding that public sector agency fees impinge on
the First Amendment, see sources collected in Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing
Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality, 130 YALE L.J. 546, 604
n.257 (2021).
34. Supra note 16.
35. Neither Janus nor Abood spelled out why states’ interest in avoiding the conflict that could
occur in a workplace that multiple unions sought to represent is compelling. For a discussion of resulting
uncertainty about whether the Court would find that states’ labor peace interest justifies any impingement
public sector exclusive representation causes, see Tang, infra note 37, at 191–93 (concluding the Court
should find that this interest justifies any such impingement). The Court’s failure to spell out its theory of
why the labor peace interest is compelling also raises questions about whether that implicit theory would
justify private sector union-strengthening laws. Analyzing those questions is beyond this Article’s scope,
but the most convincing of the possible concerns undergirding the labor peace interest would justify
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But what is certain is that the First Amendment, at least as the Roberts
Court has developed it, poses enough threat to current and future labor
law that we should consider explicating a stronger foundation for that law.
Expounding how strong unions advance a compelling interest in reducing
economic inequality’s transmission into political inequality aids that
project. Doing so also has the virtue of bringing First Amendment
analysis of labor law into better alignment with what is at stake in efforts
to strengthen—or weaken—labor unions.
Three last introductory notes. As elaborated below, strong unions
reduce economic inequality’s transmission into political inequality via
two often-overlapping but analytically distinct ways: by reducing
economic inequality itself and by reducing the extent to which that
inequality, once it arises, transmits to political inequality. Below, I use the
term reducing “wealth-based political inequality” to refer to the state
interest in reducing economic inequality’s transmission into political
inequality, and by that term I mean to encompass an interest in both these
ways of reducing that transmission. Because campaign finance
regulations reduce wealth-based political inequality via the latter way,
this Article incidentally supplements literature arguing that an interest in
reducing economic inequality’s transmission into political inequality
should justify campaign finance restrictions that the Court has held violate
the First Amendment. The Court’s holding that this interest justifies those
campaign finance restrictions would not render those restrictions less
restrictive alternatives to union-strengthening laws, though, because, inter
alia,36 holding that this interest justifies those campaign finance
restrictions would not overrule the Court’s holding that those restrictions
impinge on the First Amendment.
Second, although this Article expounds the compelling interest in
reducing wealth-based political inequality, my argument is not exclusive
of arguments that the state has a compelling interest in advancing other
forms of political equality. Rather, much of my argument applies to
arguments that the state has a compelling interest in advancing other
forms—such as gender- or race-based political equality.
Third, Professor Aaron Tang argues that reimbursing unions directly
from state coffers, rather than from fees deducted from workers’
paychecks, would be a less restrictive alternative for advancing any
interest served by public sector agency fees.37 But other scholars caution
that direct reimbursement might not be as effective at supporting strong

private sector laws.
36. For other reasons why not, see infra note 255.
37. Aaron Tang, Public Sector Unions, the First Amendment, and the Costs of Collective
Bargaining, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 144, 177–78, 204–18 (2016).
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unions.38 The less effective direct reimbursement is, the less likely it
becomes a less restrictive alternative to public sector agency fees for
reducing wealth-based inequality.39
I do not seek to resolve whether direct reimbursement would be as
effective at supporting strong unions as the agency fees Janus invalidated.
After all, this Article’s intervention extends beyond the debate about
public sector agency fees. It seeks to develop a framework for defending
not only those fees but also other union-strengthening laws—laws to
which Tang’s proposal does not apply. It should be noted, though, that
applying my framework to public sector agency fees would require more
fully addressing Tang’s argument.
II. THE STATE HAS A COMPELLING INTEREST IN REDUCING ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY’S TRANSMISSION INTO POLITICAL INEQUALITY.
In this Part, I explain why the state has a compelling interest in reducing
wealth-based political inequality. First, Section A overviews affirmative
reasons why the Court should recognize reducing this inequality to be a
foundational, urgent goal. Section B explains why concerns that the Court
has raised in its campaign finance decisions should not impede the Court
from recognizing this goal to be a compelling interest for First
Amendment purposes.
A. Affirmative Reasons
Leading investigations into the Court’s jurisprudence conclude that no
particular methodology guides the mainly ad hoc—often un- or
underexplained—judgments the Court makes in determining whether a
state interest is compelling.40 Sometimes the Court asserts that an interest
is compelling because that interest itself advances constitutional values,

38. Catherine L. Fisk & Martin H. Malin, After Janus, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1850–57 (2019);
but see Aaron Tang, Life After Janus, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 677, 755–58 (2019) (responding to Fisk &
Malin’s critique).
39. See infra Section III.A.2.
40. Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term
in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 932–37 (1988) (“[T]he Court [usually] has failed to
explain the basis for finding and deferring to compelling governmental interests.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1321–22 (2007) (“Courts and commentators have
sometimes suggested that compelling interests can be derived from the Constitution itself . . . Sometimes,
however, the Supreme Court labels interests as compelling on the basis of little or no textual inquiry.”);
see also Let the End be Legitimate: Questioning the Value of Heightened Scrutiny's Compelling- and
Important-Interest Inquiries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1410 (2016), (noting Court often deems an interest
compelling based on “unelaborated social or moral value judgments,” and sometimes based on “traditional
notions about the proper functions and operation of the state”); Richard M. Re, "Equal Right to the Poor",
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1149, 1204 (2017) (similar).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/4

8

Taylor: Political Equality and First Amendment Challenges to Labor Law

2021]

POLITICAL EQUALITY

513

goals, or rights.41 But an interest can be compelling even if it does not
advance a constitutional end.42
Facing an amorphous framework for identifying compelling
interests—a framework in which constitutional, moral, and historical
considerations all sometimes feature—I argue the government has a
compelling interest in reducing wealth-based political inequality in part
by reviewing leading accounts of why that inequality presents not just a
moral or social problem, but also a constitutional problem. If reducing
wealth-based political inequality advances constitutional values,
decisions extrapolating compelling interests from such values offer one
basis for recognizing a compelling interest in reducing that inequality. I
supplement that argument by showing that traditions of historical thought
and political theory support recognizing a compelling interest in reducing
wealth-based political inequality and that the Court’s campaign finance
decisions arguably have already implicitly recognized such a compelling
interest. But before developing these arguments, I review empirical
literature recording the extent of wealth-based political inequality in the
United States.
1. Empirics
That perceptions of the wealthy’s disproportionate political power have
produced widespread concern and anger in the United States needs no
citation. I instead here review scholarship confirming those perceptions’
accuracy. But first a few notes on terminology: my purposes here do not
require me to choose a precise definition of “the wealthy” and “economic
elites” whom I refer to throughout this Article as exercising
disproportionate political power. The data discussed here reveals outsized
political influence by persons at the ninetieth income percentile relative
to persons at the seventieth, fiftieth, thirtieth, and tenth. This data suffices
to show a remarkable wealth-based political inequality in the United
States, even if more granular data would show that, for example, the top
1% or .01% of income earners have disproportionate political power
relative to the top two through ten percent, or that inequalities in wealth

41. E.g. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–13 (1978) (holding public
university’s First Amendment right to academic freedom creates a compelling interest in being able to
admit a diverse student body); cf. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003),
overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (explaining
Court deferentially reviews Congress’s campaign contribution limits in part because interest in
“benefit[ting] public participation in political debate,” which those limits serve, is a “constitutional
interest[]” that “compet[es]” with the plaintiff’s constitutional speech interest).
42. Mark D. Rosen, When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute? McCutcheon, Conflicts, and
the Sufficiency Question, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1535, 1538 (2015); see also Fallon, supra note 40, at
1322 & ns. 305–06 (citing cases recognizing sub-constitutional compelling interests).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications,

9

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4

514

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

not captured in the income data on which I primarily rely further skew
political influence.
And in speaking of the wealthy and economic elites, I do not imply that
the wealthy form a class with monolithic policy preferences or patterns of
engaging in politics. Nor do I ignore that wealthy persons tend to
influence politics through different channels than do wealthy business
organizations.43 I use these terms instead as convenient shorthand to
discuss an aggregate phenomenon of wealth-based political inequality
that can be mitigated by strengthening unions.44
The most comprehensive study of wealth’s impact on political
influence focused on federal policy outcomes and concluded that the
wealthy’s political influence dominates that of the poor and middle
class.45 That study—conducted by Martin Gilens—found this result in all
the policy fields Gilens studied: economic and tax, social welfare,
foreign,46 and religious and social values.47 Specifically, Gilens compared
federal policy outcomes to political preferences held by people in the
tenth, fiftieth, seventieth, and ninetieth percentiles of income
distribution.48 Gilens found that when the political preferences of persons
at the ninetieth and tenth percentiles significantly diverge, only the
preferences of those at the ninetieth meaningfully influence policy
outcomes.49 He found similar results by studying outcomes when the
ninetieth percentile’s preferences significantly diverged from the
preferences held by people at the thirtieth, fiftieth, and even seventieth
percentiles.50 These comparisons to the thirtieth, fiftieth, and seventieth
percentiles help rebut the possibility that a coalition of the middle class
and the wealthy that outvotes the poor, rather than the wealthy’s dominant
political power, explains why policy outcomes correlate only with the
ninetieth percentile’s preferences across the set of policy issues for which

43. See Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and Balances,
18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419, 435–36, (2015).
44. Infra Section III.B.
45. MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL
POWER IN AMERICA 70–96 (2012).
46. For other research finding similar results in foreign policy, see BENJAMIN I. PAGE &
MARSHALL M. BOUTON, THE FOREIGN POLICY DISCONNECT: WHAT AMERICANS WANT FROM OUR
LEADERS BUT DON’T GET 170–73, 219–20 (2006); Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I. Page, Who
Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 107, 114–17 (2005).
47. Gilens, supra note 45, at 97–123.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 79–81 (concluding that when these preferences diverge, “government policy bears
absolutely no relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor.”).
50. Id. at 79–82 (noting that aside from 90th percentile, “the only hint of a link between
preferences and policies is for Americans at the 70th income percentile . . . but even for the 70th income
percentile, the coefficient is small . . . and [statistically] nonsignificant”).
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those preferences significantly diverge from the tenth’s.51 Indeed, Gilens
further rebutted the possibility that majoritarian politics, rather than the
wealthy’s dominant political power, explain his findings by examining
what happens when the preferences of the poor and middle-class align in
opposition to the ninetieth percentile’s preferences. Here, responsiveness
to the ninetieth percentile “remains strong while responsiveness to the
poor and middle class is completely absent.”52 Gilens further controlled
for the impact of education levels and found that the foregoing results
reflect policy bias toward the wealthy much more than toward the highly
educated.53
Other studies of federal policy outcomes have reached conclusions
similar to Gilens’.54 And studies have found that the wealthy wield
disproportionate political influence, relative to the poor, over state-level
political outcomes too.55 These studies have also found that, at the state
level, political inequality exists further between the middle-class and the
poor—with the former wielding disproportionate influence relative to the
latter.56
Supplementing the foregoing studies’ findings that the wealthy enjoy
disproportionate political power, Kate Andrias has catalogued how the
wealthy gain this power. Campaign spending gives wealthy individuals
and firms disproportionate access to legislators57 and favors candidates
backed by the wealthy. Aside from campaign contributors receiving

51. Id. at 83–84.
52. Id. at 84 (analyzing policy issues in which preferences of fiftieth and tenth percentile align
against preferences of ninetieth percentile).
53. Id. at 93–95.
54. See LARRY BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 253–54 (2008) (concluding senators are more
responsive to wealthy constituents and that “the views of constituents in the bottom third of the income
distribution receive[] no weight at all in the voting decisions of their senators”). Bartels controlled for
income-related disparities in voter turnout, which disparities did not “provide a plausible explanation for
the [observed] income-related disparities in responsiveness.” Id.
55. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1580
(2015); Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American States, 40 AM. POL.
RES. 29, 42 tbl. 1 (2012) (finding low-income residents have essentially no impact, while middle-income
and high-income residents have substantial impact, on state-level policy); Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C.
Wright, Whose Statehouse Democracy? Policy Responsiveness to Poor Versus Rich Constituents in Poor
Versus Rich States, in WHO GETS REPRESENTED 189, 208–09 tbl. 7.5, 213–14 tbl. 7.6 (Peter K. Enns &
Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011) (listing results from four models measuring state-level political influence,
all of which find low-income residents have no impact on state-level economic or social policy while
high-income residents have substantial impact on those policy domains, three of which find middleincome residents have substantial impact, and one of which finds middle-income residents have minimal
impact).
56. Flavin, supra note 55; Rigby & Wright, supra note 55.
57. Andrias, supra note 43, at 445; Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Brockman, Campaign
Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Individuals: A Randomized Field Experiment, 60 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 545, 556 (2016) (demonstrating that campaign contributions increase contributors’ access to
policymakers).
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preferential access to legislators, the wealthy also gain disproportionate
access to legislators through lobbying. Wealthy firms and organizations
that represent wealthy individuals are disproportionately able to offer
lobbyists to legislators,58 and legislators rely on these lobbyists to flag
issues worth addressing and to provide technical expertise concerning
how to address those issues. Legislators, while shaping policy, also rely
on their own intuitions, which some scholars have argued
disproportionately favor the wealthy’s interests, because federal and state
legislators disproportionately come from more affluent backgrounds or
large firms or business organizations.59 Wealthy organizations
additionally shape outcomes through their participation in the regulatory
process. There is evidence that, particularly for regulatory issues that are
complex and not highly salient, wealthy organizations are
disproportionately able to shape regulations.60 The revolving door
problem61 can exacerbate the regulatory influence that industry groups
command.62
2. The Constitutional Interest
The above research suggests that the wealthy dominate political
outcomes at both the federal and state level. That research suggests further
that the wealthy dominate politics by capturing multiple branches of
government at each level. Scholars have begun to explain how these
outcomes betray goals the Framers sought to achieve through the
Constitution’s structural safeguards for spreading political power across
different political actors—safeguards including federalism, separation of
powers, and other structural provisions in the Constitution. Scholars have
begun to explain, that is, how the wealthy’s political dominance is not
merely a moral or political-philosophical problem, but a constitutional
58. See Andrias, supra note 43, at 440, 446.
59. NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE-COLLAR GOVERNMENT, 7, 19–21 (2013) (finding legislators from
working class backgrounds more support economically redistributive policies than do legislators from
white-collar backgrounds, and working-class persons typically comprise approximately two to three
percent of federal and state legislatures, although comprise between fifty and sixty percent of U.S.
population); see also Andrias, supra note 43, at 447.
60. Andrias, supra note 43, at 449–51; Willian T. Gormley, Jr., Regulatory Issue Networks in a
Federal System, 18 POLITY 595, 606–07 (1986) (“When issues are highly complex and not very salient,
conditions are ripe for policymaking by a power elite.”); Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law As
Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in A Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1745–47 (2012) (noting
information asymmetries provide industry groups disproportionate influence over regulatory processes);
see also supra note 55 and accompanying text (noting wealthy are disproportionately able to furnish
lobbyists to lawmakers).
61. That is, the problem whereby agency officials’ and staffers’ plans to later work for the
industries they regulate dampens their willingness to aggressively regulate those industries.
62. Andrias, supra note 43, at 450–451 (surveying literature on revolving door, while explaining
the revolving door theory “does not hold up in all contexts”).
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problem too.
The conceptual starting point for this constitutional argument is that
the Framers designed the Constitution to prevent two types of political
pathology: first, corrupt federal officials’ “tyrannizing and plundering”
their constituents, and second, “dominant factions of the electorate . . .
captur[ing] the government for their own selfish ends[.]”63 The
Constitution’s separation of powers and federalism structures ensure that
the power to make and implement policy does not unduly concentrate in
any one governmental institution, partly to preclude the first pathology
above. But the Framers designed those and other structures of the
Constitution also to guard against the second pathology. That is, to
balance political power among different social groups.
The wealthy’s domination of multiple—or all—branches of
government conflicts with at least one purpose64 of the Constitution’s
separating political power among three branches of government: the
purpose of reducing the risk that any one “faction” would dominate
policymaking.65 Separating powers reduces this risk because electing
legislative and executive representatives at separate times and via
different electorates helps ensure that officials accountable to different
coalitions of interests can check and balance each other.66 But the
wealthy’s dominating policymaking by both of these branches affronts
the goal of preventing any one faction from dominating policy.67
The Framers additionally designed certain of the Constitution’s other
structures as tools to balance political power among different social and
interest groups. Perhaps the chief social group division that concerned the
Framers was the division between slaveowners and non-slaveowners. The
Constitution established the bicameral legislature, Electoral College, and
Three-Fifths Clause to prevent the interests of either slaveowners or of
non-slaveowners from dominating national politics at the expense of the
63. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 666 (2011); Andrias, supra note 43, at 433.
64. Purposes additional to democratic accountability that separating powers advances include
“energetic, efficient government,” Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725,
1729–30 (1996), competent government, see Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113
HARV. L. REV. 633, 640 (2000), and protection of fundamental rights, see id.
65. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 435 (1987)
(“The separation of powers and the system of checks and balances were intended to reduce th[e] risk . . .
[that] private groups, whether minorities or (more likely) majorities, might use governmental authority to
oppress others . . . A faction might come to dominate one branch, but it was unlikely to acquire power
over all three.”).
66. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 64 (2005) (“[B]ecause each
government entity would be selected in a different way by a different constituency, ultimate government
policy would reflect multiple indices of popular sentiment . . . different branches chosen at different times
through different voting rules might together produce a more accurate and more stable composite sketch
of deliberate public opinion.”).
67. See generally Andrias, supra note 43.
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other group’s interests.68
The Constitution’s federalism structure likewise balanced political
power among different social groups,69 although the extent to which the
Framers intended federalism to effect that balance is not always clear. At
the Founding and post-ratification, there were several distinct social
group divisions among which federalism balanced power. Again,
slaveholders used federalism to protect their interests against a federal
government that could otherwise better implement abolitionists’ goals.70
More generally, different industries dominated southern and northern
economies.71 Federalism helped prevent groups from using the federal
government to promote industries upon which they relied at the expense
of groups that relied on other industries.72 And constitutional historians
have argued the Establishment Clause was originally understood to
protect state-level religious establishments’ ability to avoid domination
by any federally-imposed religious establishment.73 Because different
states had established different religions, the federalist division of power
enabled persons belonging to these different religions to gain state-level
representation.74 Some scholars have even argued federalism functioned
initially to protect the ability of low- and middle-income classes to
advance their interests through state legislatures, which were more
accountable to those classes than was the federal government75—
although these scholars have yet offered limited evidence that the Framers
intended federalism to protect against the wealthy’s disproportionate
political power.
But does the wealthy’s political dominance really conflict with the goal
that the above constitutional designs advance of balancing power among
social groups? One might object that we should not give too much weight
to one purpose among several that the separation of powers advances. One
68. See Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31,
98 (2016) (“Proportional representation in the lower house of Congress and the Electoral College,
bolstered by the Three-Fifths Clause, was supposed to guarantee that the South would soon have secure
control over the House of Representatives and the presidency, while the greater number of Northern states
would dominate the Senate.”).
69. Id. at 83 (“[F]ederalism w[as] once conceived as mechanisms for balancing power among
interests and social groups.”).
70. Id. at 103.
71. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP 186–90 (2016).
72. See Levinson, supra note 68, at 102.
73. See Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting
Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 163 (2005) (noting Establishment Clause “indicated restraints on the
ability of the federal government to interfere with state religious ‘establishments”); Akhil Reed Amar,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32–34 (1998) (“The original establishment clause . . . is agnostic on the substantive
issue of establishment versus nonestablishment and simply calls for the issue to be decided locally.”).
74. See Levinson, supra note 68, at 103 (noting “[s]everal states established different religions”).
75. Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, & the Constitution of
Opportunity, 58 NOMOS 45, 62, 70–71 (2017).
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could then object that the Framers’ designing other constitutional
provisions to balance political power between certain social groups says
nothing about whether the Framers would have been concerned with
political power imbalances between other groups—as relevant here,
between different economic classes. Indeed, other nations have expressly
structured their constitutions to help balance political power between
different economic classes.76 If the Framers wanted to preclude economic
inequality from translating into political inequality, one might wonder,
why did they not, for instance, establish a bicameral legislature in which
the House would be elected only by voters of below median wealth and
the Senate only by voters of above median wealth? Or why did they not
use some other means to constitutionalize economic equality?
The reason is not that the Framers thought the republic could survive
gross economic inequality, historians argue. Gordon Wood writes that
“[a]lthough most Americans in 1776 believed that not everyone in a
republic had to have the same amount of property . . . all took for granted
that a society could not long remain republican if a tiny minority
controlled most of the wealth.”77
Instead, one explanation scholars advance is that many Framers
thought the government should and could adequately prevent economic
inequalities from arising in the first place, obviating the need to
incorporate economic class divisions into the government’s structure or
otherwise constitutionally limit economic inequality’s transmission into
political inequality. The United States’ political economy at the time of
the Founding was marked by a dominantly agrarian economy in which
the policy of expropriating territory from indigenous people made land—
back then, the primary source of wealth—seem abundant and widely
obtainable.78 Historians have argued that this backdrop caused James
Madison, other Framers, and early political leaders to think that policies
that facilitated land ownership would roughly ensure economic equality
between the members of the population who these Framers and leaders
expected to comprise the voting polity: white, property-owning men.79
Only by maintaining rough economic equality through such policies, John
Adams wrote in 1776, could the republic the Framers envisioned
succeed.80
76. See Ganesh Sitaraman, Economic Structure and Constitutional Structure: An Intellectual
History, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1305–11 (2016) (describing Rome as example).
77. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815
7–8 (2009).
78. See GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 8 (2017).
79. See id. at 8-11, 15.
80. Adams wrote then that because “[political] power always follows property . . .[t]he only
possible way . . . of preserving the balance of power on the side of equal liberty and public virtue, is to . .
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The Framers therefore designed the Constitution against a backdrop of
assumptions about economic equality that reflected the politicaleconomic conditions of the Framers’, but not our own, time. Land soon
became limited, industrialization transitioned the United States from an
agrarian economy and substantially shifted populations to cities, and
corporations and trusts emerged, leading to concentrations of economic
power that the Framers had not envisioned.81 Today, the constitutional
premise many Framers shared—that gross economic inequality begets
political inequality incompatible with a republic—remains. But the
Framers’ policy premise—that the republic would prevent that ill by
making land widely available—proved wrong.
A second objection to my argument is that the Framers’ constitutional
design in some ways aimed to limit the political power of economically
subordinate groups—power some Framers worried these groups would
leverage into laws that would violate ostensible property rights.82 Stateenacted debtor relief laws especially stoked those Framers’ concern.83
But many scholars show that these Framers’ underlying vision here
was to preserve the ability of putatively noble, learned legislators to
deliberate toward proper policy outcomes, by distancing those legislators
from any powerful “faction”—the idea being that populist pressures could
amount to capture by faction.84 This (normatively debatable) vision is
consistent with the Framers’ belief that excessive wealth-based political
inequality is hostile to the republic they envisioned and that lawmakers
. make a division of land into small quantities, so that the multitude may be possessed of landed estates.
If the multitude is possessed of the balance of real estates, the multitude will have the balance of power,
and in that case the multitude will take care of the liberty, virtue, and interest of the multitude, in all acts
of government.” ERIC NELSON, THE GREEK TRADITION IN REPUBLICAN THOUGHT 209 (2004).
81. Sitaraman, supra note 78, at 16; Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 75, at 87 (noting that by the
time of Jackson’s presidency, “big firms and nation-spanning corporations had come to dominate the
entire economy . . . This was the moment when the nation haltingly confronted the fact that the United
States, like Europe, was destined to have a vast, permanent class of propertyless wage earners. It was no
longer possible to contend that the industrial hireling was on a path to owning his own workshop, the
agricultural tenant or laborer his own farm.”).
82. See, e.g., Gerald Leonard, Jefferson’s Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CLASSICS:
PATTERNS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT FROM JOHN FORTESCUE TO JEREMY BENTHAM 369, 369 (D.J.
Galligan ed., 2015) (“The drafters of the 1787 Constitution designed the new national government to
gather more power at the centre . . . Enhanced powers at the centre and new limitations on state powers
would insulate government from excessively direct control of the people and limit the states’ capacities
to violate rights of property and the like.”); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 149, 218 (1990).
83. See Jack N. Rakove, Confederation and Constitution, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW
IN AMERICA: VOLUME 1, EARLY AMERICA (1580-1815) 482, 502–03 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher
Tomlins, eds., 2008).
84. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 73, at 29 (noting “the Madisonian system of deliberation among
refined representatives” sought to ensure “each representative [w]ould be bound [not] by his relatively
uninformed and parochial constituents [but] rather [by] his conscience, enlightened by full discussions
with his fellow representatives bringing information and ideas from other parts of the country”); Leonard,
supra note 82, at 369, 380 (similar).
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should take certain actions to maintain a rough economic equality—just
not actions violating ostensible property rights. Indeed, the founding-era
assumption that lawmakers could maintain a rough economic equality
among white men by distributing “open” land likely made the Framers
complacent about detached legislators’ ability to maintain such equality.
Rather than question that the Framers believed rough economic equality
is necessary, we should question whether economic elites’ current
domination of political outcomes is compatible with the Framers’
objective of fostering public policy that reflects legislators’ considered
judgments about what serves the public good, rather than reflects pressure
from a powerful faction.
Moreover, although Madison viewed the distinction between slave
states and non-slave states as “the great division of interests in the United
States,”85 he thought the constitutional structures that balanced power
among these states implemented the more general principle that “every
peculiar interest whether in any class of citizens, or any description of
states, ought to be secured as far as possible.”86 Gilens’ data suggests the
United States’ economic inequality has begot a political inequality that
undermines that constitutional goal.
3. The Interest as Understood Historically and in Political Theory
Traditions of historical thought and political theory likewise support
recognizing that reducing wealth-based political inequality is a
compelling state interest. Various political theorists have developed
arguments why a democracy’s constituents should each have a roughly
equal opportunity to influence political outcomes. John Rawls, for the
most cited instance, argued that all citizens should have an
“approximately equal” opportunity to “influence the outcome of political
decisions”87—a goal that Rawls deemed to be equally important for
establishing a just and free society as is the goal of ensuring
unencumbered political speech.88 Rawls also believed economic
inequality, by translating into political inequality, undermined this goal.89
Because, as Section II.B elaborates, the Court’s resistance to recognizing
85. 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD
at 264 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891).
86. Klarman, supra note 71, at 257 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 486 (Max Farrand ed., 1911 (statement of James Madison)); Levinson, supra note 68, at 98.
87. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 327 (1993).
88. See Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance
Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 601 (2008) (“Rawls argued that the . . . guarantee of roughly equal
influence for everyone over all stages of the electoral process, is at least as high a constitutional priority
as unfettered political speech.”).
89. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 90–95 (1971); cf. Rawls, supra note 87, at 267.
AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787,
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an explicit compelling interest in political equality owes more to
prudential concerns than to disagreement with the principle that a republic
should aspire to a rough political equality, I do not here further survey
philosophical arguments supporting that aspiration.90
Of course, in no democracy could every constituent have exactly equal
influence. But the inability to specify the exact threshold at which wealthbased political inequalities become unacceptable should not prevent us
from recognizing that the level of distortion that Gilens’ and other studies
have revealed is unacceptable.91
Nor do the Court’s precedents demand that we identify such a
threshold before recognizing a compelling interest in reducing wealthbased political inequality. The Court has recognized state interests in
“[m]aintaining a stable political system”92 and in “procuring the
manpower necessary for military purposes,”93 for instance, without
attempting to define how much military manpower suffices or the point
at which political instability becomes a compelling concern.94 And as
elaborated below,95 the Court’s approach to administering constitutional
ideals of equality in other contexts shows that it suffices to select some
plausible threshold at which wealth-based political inequalities trigger a
compelling interest, even if a different threshold would also have been
plausible.
The notion that economic inequality threatens this country’s
constitutional structure further claims a substantial historical pedigree. As
touched on in Part II-A(2), historians have recorded this notion’s
Founding-era purchase.96 And post-ratification thinkers continued to
90. For a political-theoretical account additional to Rawls’ concerning why economic inequality
and wealth-based political inequality are hostile to a republic, see generally, e.g., Jack M. Balkin,
Republicanism and the Constitution of Opportunity, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1427 (2016).
91. Cf. Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1612 (1999)
(“In theory and in doctrine, we can often identify what is troublingly unfair, unequal, or wrong without a
precise standard of what is optimally fair, equal, or right.”).
A separate but similar point is that people can agree wealth-based political inequality is a
compelling problem even if they subscribe to different of various theories about how to best structure
governmental representation of the citizenry. See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic
Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1467–71 (2016) (explaining why this
inequality undermines “a variety of constitutional theories on their own terms,” including majoritarian,
democratic, and optimistic pluralist theories, Republicanism, and other theories of representation, yet
acknowledging this transmission is not a problem for some theories).
92. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 226 (1989).
93. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971).
94. Cf. Fallon, supra note 40, at 1271 (noting similar indefiniteness occurs whenever government
asserts compelling interest in national security or in protecting children).
95. Infra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.
96. For more on how this notion pervaded that era’s thinking, see Fishkin & Forbath, supra note
75, at 62–70 (documenting how “the revolutionary generation . . . held it a constitutional essential for the
new United States to avoid reproducing the hierarchies, titles, and aristocratic forms of privilege and
elitism that the colonists hoped to leave behind. Most deemed it no less essential to supplant that
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repeatedly regard economic inequality as a matter of constitutional
concern. President Martin Van Buren believed that republican
constitutionalism required permanent political organization among the
non-wealthy to ensure that no aristocracy wielded outsized political
influence.97 And President Jackson and his political followers argued that
economic inequality threatened “the grand republican principle of Equal
Rights—a principle which lies at the bottom of our constitution” in part
because that economic inequality forms a vicious cycle with political
inequality.98 Later, many Reconstruction-era lawmakers and citizens
understood the Reconstruction Constitution to demand strengthening
labor rights to combat economic inequality.99
Through the Gilded age and into the early twentieth century, too, labor
advocates often understood labor rights as serving this constitutional
function.100 More generally, those eras’ reformers commonly understood
economic inequality as posing a constitutional problem.101 These views
found famous expression when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
pitched an economically redistributive “Second Bill of Rights” to create
an “economic constitutional order”102 that would “protect majorities
against the enthronement of” economic elites.103 Such an order, Roosevelt
argued, would vindicate the “political equality we once had won” but that
“economic inequality” had rendered “meaningless” for too many
people.104
If, for various reasons,105 today’s arguments about economic equality
aristocratic order with a republic . . . of ‘middling sorts,’ without extremes of wealth or poverty—above
all, without a permanent class of impoverished . . . toilers or a permanent wealthy elite.”).
97. Leonard, supra note 82, at 387.
98. Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 75, at 75–79 (elaborating Jacksonian view that economic
inequality presented constitutional problem).
99. Id. at 83–84.
100. See Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 BOSTON U. L.
REV. 669, 684–85, 689 (2014).
101. See, Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 75, at 88; cf. K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy,
and Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?,
94 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1337–44 (2016).
102. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress Reviewing the Broad Objectives and
Accomplishments of the Administration (June 8, 1934), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (New York, Random House, 1938), 3: 287, 288, 292.
103. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive Government (Sept. 23, 1932), in
id., 1: 752.
104. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency (June 27, 1936),
in id., 5: 230, 231–34.
105. Compare Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 75, at 55 (attributing decrease in argumentation that
economic inequality is a constitutional problem to certain historical contingencies, including a shift
toward conceiving constitutional argument as something “more clause-bound, and more strictly tied to
what courts enforce, than anything nineteenth-century or early twentieth-century Americans would
recognize,” with Kate Andrias, Building Labor's Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1591, 1593–94 (2016)
(arguing that, although “conceptually sound” arguments exist that the Constitution “support[s] rights to
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air less often in a constitutional key, the above examples show that
arguments proclaiming this equality’s constitutional stakes are far from
foreign to this country’s constitutional tradition.
4. The Doctrinal Interest
The Court’s campaign finance decisions arguably have recognized, at
least formerly, a compelling interest in reducing wealth-based political
inequality.106 Before Citizens United v. FEC confirmed that only an
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance can justify
restrictions on independent expenditures, the Court in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce107 recognized a compelling interest in preventing
corporations’ “immense aggregations of wealth” from distorting the
political speech marketplace.108 Additionally, the Court in Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Gov't PAC109 and later cases recognized a state interest110 in
preventing corruption defined as political officials’ privileging large
campaign donors’ preferences.111 As Chief Justice Roberts’ Citizens
United concurrence observed, “most scholars acknowledge” that the
interest Austin deemed compelling was essentially the interest in political
equality.112 And multiple scholars have noted that the corruption interest
Nixon recognized is best understood as an interest in preventing economic
inequality’s transmission into unequal political influence. David Strauss,
for example, offers an extended argument why, if everyone had equal
wealth to contribute to campaigns, elected officials’ privileging campaign
donors’ preferences would unlikely be troubling and could instead
improve democratic accountability by letting constituents record the
decent employment and unionization,” many in the labor movement have deprioritized these arguments
due to concerns about relying on court-derived rights to advance labor’s goals).
106. Supplementing the decisions discussed below is Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433
(2015), where the Court, in rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a law prohibiting state judges from
personally soliciting campaign donations, invoked the judicial oath to do equal right to the poor and to the
rich. Id. at 445. For an argument that this oath instantiates an equal right principle that supports
recognizing economic equality as a compelling interest, see Re, supra note 40, at 1203–07.
107. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010).
108. Id. at 660.
109. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
110. Formally the interest Nixon recognized was a “sufficiently important interest,” because Nixon
applied a form of heightened scrutiny below strict scrutiny. Id. at 388. Nixon nonetheless is a good
indicator of the Court’s willingness, formerly, to recognize a compelling interest in wealth-based political
inequality. For the Court does not use a meaningfully different methodology for determining whether an
interest is compelling than whether an interest is important. See generally Let the End Be Legitimate,
supra note 40.
111. Id. at 389, accord., e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (plurality).
112. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 381 & n.2 (2010) (collecting
sources).
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salience of their political preferences.113 And, as Kathleen Sullivan notes,
because the money that Nixon deemed corrupting goes to campaign funds
and not candidates’ own pockets, the interest Nixon recognized does not
reduce to the interest in preventing legislators from improperly treating
public office as an object for personal monetary profit. It instead reflects
a concern with “unequal outlays of political money creat[ing] inequality
in political representation.”114 Indeed, Justice Breyer’s Nixon
concurrence more overtly foregrounded the equality interest the majority
there recognized, by describing the state’s interest as one in
“democratiz[ing] the influence that money itself may bring to bear upon
the electoral process.”115
Although Citizens United overruled Austin and held that the state lacks
a compelling interest in preventing corruption as defined by Nixon, even
the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption that Citizens United
deemed compelling retains an equality element. Sullivan’s, and to some
extent Strauss’s, arguments both apply to quid pro quo corruption.
But the precise extent to which the interest in preventing quid pro quo
corruption reduces to a concern with wealth-based political inequality is
not here important.116 What matters is, first, that Austin and Nixon show
that the Court has recognized state interests that boil down to the interest
in reducing wealth-based political inequality. This history suggests that
judicial recognition of this latter interest is no pipe dream. And, second,
that even the narrower interest Citizens United substituted for the interests
that Austin and Nixon recognized embodies, to a significant extent, a
concern with wealth-based political inequality.
B. Prudential Concerns
There are therefore substantial affirmative arguments that the
government has a compelling interest in reducing wealth-based political
inequality. But any argument in favor of this interest should address the
concerns that have caused the Court in its campaign finance decisions—
starting with Buckley v. Valeo117—to so far reject a broader compelling
interest in political equality full-stop.118 Scholars have explained that the
113. David A. Strauss, What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
141, 142–49 (1995); see also RICHARD HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 81-82 (2016) (same).
114. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663,
678–79 (1997); Strauss, supra note 113, at 144, 148 (same).
115. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring).
116. Concerning other conceptualizations of that interest, see generally Yasmin
Dawood, Classifying Corruption, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2014).
117. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
118. Buckley rejected a compelling interest in “equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
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Court has rejected a compelling interest in political equality not because
political equality is an uncompelling goal in principle, but because the
Court has worried lawmakers could—through laws ostensibly aimed at
equalizing political speech—try to suppress dissent, to more generally
retaliate against disfavored viewpoints, or to otherwise entrench
themselves in office.119
Then-professor Elena Kagan more specifically argued that two
premises have caused the Court to reject a compelling interest in political
equality. First, legislators have inherent incentives to pursue these bad
motives, which raises the risk that laws aimed at altering the speech
market will advance these motives.120 Second, the difficulty of measuring
whether different groups do have disproportionate political influence
hinders the Court’s ability to assess whether a speech regulation
ostensibly advancing political equality does advance that goal or instead
advances only the aforementioned bad motives.121
But as elaborated below, the emergence since Buckley of databases
recording groups’ policy preferences at the federal and state levels
suggests that measuring groups’ political influence is more viable than
this second premise credits—at least as to gender, race, and income.122
While we can question whether lacking reliable methodologies for
measuring groups’ political power warranted the campaign finance
decisions’ even initially rejecting a compelling interest in political
equality, this new data especially calls for reevaluating that rejection.
To discuss the fears Kagan noted, I below organize the Court’s stated
reasons for rejecting a compelling interest in political equality into two
analytically distinct, although functionally overlapping, concerns. First,
the concern that legislators will use political equality as a pretext for laws
groups to influence the outcome of elections.” Id. at 48. The Court reasoned that “the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment” – a much-criticized conclusion the Court announced
without citing direct support. Id. The Court later applied Buckley to reject various regulatory schemes
meant to equalize electoral candidates’ financial resources. In Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, the Court
rejected a compelling interest in “level[ing] electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal
wealth.” 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008) 741. Later, Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett
concluded at a higher level of generality that “the government has [no] compelling state interest in
‘leveling the playing field’ that can justify undue burdens on political speech.” 564 U.S. 721, 749 (2011).
119. David A. Strauss, The Equality Taboo, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 509, 511–12 (2015); Elena
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 468–72 (1996).
120. Id. at 469.
121. Id. at 469–70.
122. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 55, at 1531, 1572–1602 (demonstrating that recently
available data at federal and state levels permits assessing whether these groups’ “aggregate policy
preferences are less likely to be enacted than those of similarly sized and classified groups”); see also
supra notes 45–55 and accompanying text (detailing studies assessing income-based disparities in
political influence at federal and state levels).
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that entrench their (or their party’s) incumbency. Second, the concern that
an interest in equalizing political influence lacks a limiting principle.
1. Entrenchment Concerns
The most common way the Court has expressed the entrenchment
concern in its campaign finance decisions is by noting that campaign
finance restrictions inherently advantage incumbent legislators over nonincumbent candidates because the latter depend more than the former on
campaign spending.123 But at least one Justice has explicitly worried that
legislators may use such restrictions to increase the relative power of
groups on whom the legislators partly rely for reelection.124
Some Justices would likely harbor a similar concern with recognizing
a compelling interest in reducing wealth-based political inequality in the
labor law context. Legislators’ goals in strengthening unions might be not
only to reduce wealth-based political inequality, but also to strengthen the
political clout of an institution that tends to support Democrats.125 In fact,
Justice Kennedy hinted, during Janus’s oral argument, that unions’
political clout counseled in favor of invalidating Illinois’ agency fees
statute—although he did not explain why that clout so counseled.126
This section’s remainder addresses Justice Kennedy’s possible
concerns. I first explain why any legislative intent to use unionstrengthening laws to increase the electoral prospects of specific
legislators, or of Democrats in general, would not constitute viewpoint
discrimination. I then argue that legislators’ enacting these laws with at
least some motive to entrench themselves or their party should not
otherwise preclude those laws’ being justified by a compelling interest in
reducing wealth-based political inequality. I finally argue that the threat
that these laws will effect that entrenchment—regardless of legislative
motive—should not preclude their being justified by that compelling
interest.

123. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56–57, (1976).
124. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 692 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Although labor unions contribute to both major political parties, unions have historically
offered more support to Democrats. Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and
Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 436 n.133 (2015).
126. When the union’s lawyers agreed that “if [they] d[id] not prevail in this case, the unions will
have less political influence,” Justice Kennedy asked, ““Isn't that the end of this case?” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 54, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466), 2018 WL 1383160. Justice Kennedy did not note
that unions use this influence disproportionately to support Democrats. We can wonder whether his
concern would remain if unions’ political influence were evenly distributed among political parties.
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i. Bolstering Political Allies is Not Viewpoint Discrimination
Justice Kennedy unlikely thought that legislators’ enacting laws partly
with the goal of strengthening groups who politically support them ipso
facto constitutes viewpoint discrimination. For that claim seems
untenable. Daryl Levinson and Ben Sachs explain how legislators enact
innumerable laws that have the potential and often the goal of
strengthening entities or coalitions that support these legislators or their
party.127 Even if the Court believed legislators enact union-strengthening
laws partly to increase political speech favoring Democrats, the Court’s
holding that these laws therefore viewpoint discriminate would require
the Court to address why countless laws of the sorts that Levinson and
Sachs identified do not also viewpoint discriminate. For instance, if
minimum wage earners disproportionately favor Democrats, would
minimum wage laws violate the First Amendment because they
predictably increase these workers’ resources to engage in political
speech supporting Democrats? Would laws weakening unions viewpoint
discriminate because they predictably reduce speech supporting
Democrats?
Any holding that union-strengthening laws are viewpoint
discriminatory based on the Court’s belief that legislators enacted those
laws to strengthen unions’ ability to support Democrats would not only
lack a limiting principle. Such a holding would additionally face doctrinal
barriers. For starters, United States v. O’Brien128 should foreclose
speculations about this motive. O’Brien stands for the proposition that,
although the government’s restricting speech for viewpointdiscriminatory reasons impinges on the First Amendment, the Court’s
tools for sussing out such motive do not include freewheeling
speculation.129 The Court instead limits itself to doctrinal tools as proxies
to sleuth such motives. In particular, the Court uses divergent standards
of review for laws depending on whether those laws are facially
viewpoint-discriminatory, content-based, or content-neutral.130 The Court
does so due to the conceptual and evidentiary difficulties that inquiries

127. Levinson & Sachs, supra note 125, at 407–08, 426–55 (2015) (illustrating “three general
mechanisms of functional entrenchment. First, politicians, parties, and temporarily prevailing coalitions
can enact substantive policies that strengthen political allies or weaken political opponents. Second, they
can enact policies or programs that change the composition of the political community, selecting in allies
or selecting out opponents. Third, they can shift the locus of political decision making to an actor or
institution that is responsive to allies or unresponsive to opponents.”).
128. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
129. Kagan, supra note 119, at 492; see O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 (“[T]his Court will not strike
down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”).
130. Kagan, supra note 119, at 443–92.
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into legislative motive inevitably face.131 And although inferences of
impermissible legislative intent are a doctrinally-sound basis for finding
violations of the Equal Protection Clause,132 the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause,133 and the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause,134 O’Brien remains good law at least as to non-religion First
Amendment allegations.135
Even if O’Brien did not bar the Court’s freestyle speculation into
entrenchment motive, the Court held in Rucho v. Common Cause,136
where plaintiffs alleged that partisan gerrymanders violate the First
Amendment, that legislators' intentionally bolstering coalitions that
support their political party does not in itself constitute viewpoint
discrimination or otherwise impinge on the First Amendment.137 And
assuming that Rucho’s First Amendment holding should not be limited to
the partisan gerrymandering context just because the decision reasoned
partly from considerations specific thereto,138 Rucho counsels against any
distinction between legislators’ bolstering favorable political coalitions
by diluting the power of partisan opponents’ vote and by altering the
electoral speech marketplace. For Rucho acknowledged that partisan

131. There are conceptual barriers to defining what would constitute any legislator’s intent,
“[c]onsider[ing] that each legislator possesses a complex mix of hopes, expectations, beliefs, and
attitudes.” Kagan, supra note 119, at 438. These conceptual difficulties compound when we consider that
legislatures have many members. Id.; O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 384.
These conceptual difficulties dissolve if we seek to identify, not “the” or “a” “legislative
intent,” but instead any motivation that was a but-for cause of a law’s enactment. E.g. Laurence H. Tribe,
The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and
Animal Sacrifice, 1993 S. CT. REV. 1, 33 n. 79. But although but-for motive is a coherent concept, the
Court has no reliable way to sleuth out such motive. Kagan, supra note 119, at 440. Accordingly, the
Court relies on the proxies I listed in the main text for identifying impermissible intent. Although those
proxies are imperfect, “the alternative– a direct inquiry into motive –will produce even more frequent
errors.” Id. at 453.
132. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
133. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987).
134. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
135. E.g. First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1278 (9th Cir. 2017).
136. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
137. Id. at 2504 (holding that legislators’ intentionally using redistricting to weaken the ability of
voters to form a prevailing coalition for the opposing party does not impinge on the First Amendment).
138. Rucho reasoned partly that the Framers’ choice to entrust districting to legislatures, whom the
Framers knew would engage in partisan gerrymandering, counsels against holding that partisan
gerrymanders violate the First Amendment. Id. at 2494–97. But separate from this argument about
Framers’ intent, Rucho reasoned also that some partisan motivation is inevitable in legislative redistricting
and courts lack judicially manageable standards for determining a threshold at which such partisan
motivation becomes unconstitutional. Id. at 2504–05 and Gaffney passage there cited. This latter reasoning
supports finding that legislative motive to bolster partisan coalitions through means other than
gerrymandering likewise does not, standing alone, violate the First Amendment, given this motive’s
inevitable entanglement with countless laws and the lack of manageable standards for identifying
impermissible legislative intent. Supra notes 127–131 and accompanying text.
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gerrymanders impair the disadvantaged party’s ability to elicit
volunteers.139
One might think a different analysis were due if union-strengthening
laws improved Democrats’ chances by restricting speech favoring
Republicans. But they do not. Assuming arguendo that private sector
exclusive representation restricts rights to speak, that restriction limits
only a worker’s ability to negotiate terms of employment with her
employer. This speech is arguably, by Janus’s logic, political speech for
First Amendment purposes. But this speech is no vehicle for electoral
advocacy. And other challenges to union-strengthening laws do not allege
restriction of a worker’s right to speak.140
Nor could a plaintiff try to distinguish Rucho by arguing agency fees
force her to aid speech favoring Democrats. None of the ways agency fees
strengthen unions’ electoral political advocacy, elaborated below,141
involve compelling anyone to fund that advocacy. Nor could unions do
so: the Court’s longstanding holdings that unions may not require anyone
to subsidize union speech on electoral politics remain good law.142
ii. Entrenchment Motive Should Not Preclude a Compelling Interest
More likely, then, Justice Kennedy’s concern was that an agency fees
statute’s being enacted to some extent due to legislators’ entrenchment
motives would vitiate the state’s claim that the statute advances
compelling interests in labor peace and preventing free riders. Yet the
Court has never explained why the threat of entrenchment motives or
effects should in itself bar finding that a compelling interest in political
equality justifies a First Amendment-impinging law that advances that
equality.
Kagan’s account seemingly explains why not: arguing that
entrenchment motive and entrenchment effect should not invalidate a law
that advances political equality is beside the point if the Court lacks
reliable means of ensuring that the law does so. But because recent
139. Id. at 2504.
140. Challenges to agency fees and to public sector exclusive representation raise only compelled
speech and association claims. Public sector exclusive representation cannot restrict rights to speak
because the state’s greater power to negotiate with no employees includes a lesser power to negotiate
with, as it were, only some. See Thompson v. Marietta Educ. Ass’n, 371 F.Supp.3d 431, 435 (S.D. Ohio
2019) and transcript cited therein.
141. Infra notes 220–226 and accompanying text.
142. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (holding First Amendment bars
requiring objecting workers to fund union spending for “the expression of political views, on behalf of
political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to [the union’s]
duties as collective-bargaining representative”; Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762–
63 (1988) (interpreting NLRA to not authorize collective bargaining agreements that permit unions to
require objecting workers to fund such spending).
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advances in data improve the Court’s ability to measure whether laws do
advance political equality,143 I address here why neither the threat of
entrenchment motive nor of entrenchment effect should in principle bar
recognizing a compelling interest in reducing wealth-based political
inequality.
Again, although the Court has, in the context of the First Amendment’s
religion clauses, circumvented O’Brien’s bar on inquiries into legislative
motive, O’Brien shows at least that there is no uniform First Amendment
anti-pretext principle that would require the Court to deny a compelling
interest in political equality based on the Court’s speculating that
legislatures were only pretextually advancing that interest.
Are there nonetheless good other reasons for the Court to deny this
compelling interest based on such pretext concerns? An affirmative
answer seems unlikely even if we set aside the conceptual and evidentiary
concerns that inquiries into legislative motive raise.144 Imagine first
(implausibly) that no legislators who voted for a hypothetical First
Amendment-impinging law that does advance political equality at all
hoped to thereby advance political equality. Imagine they all merely
hoped to entrench their incumbency. Even if so, that motive should
unlikely in itself preclude a compelling interest in political equality from
justifying the law. First, the point of permitting compelling interests to
justify First Amendment impingements more likely is to permit state
action that advances a state of affairs that crucially benefits a polity, than
to ensure the legislature’s subjective satisfaction whenever the legislature
wants to advance such a state of affairs. Second, any goal of
disincentivizing or punishing unseemly legislative motive unlikely
warrants invalidating the law. For if advancing political equality were
important enough to justify a First Amendment impingement when the
legislature intended to advance that political equality—a position that
follows from any claim that a law would be justified by a compelling
interest in political equality but for concerns that entrenchment motives
underly the law—why would advancing that political equality not be
important enough to outweigh the court’s distaste for crass political
motives that are not themselves unconstitutional?145
And of course, the legislative motive underlying any law that
meaningfully advances political equality would surely be, at worse,

143. Supra note 122 and accompanying text.
144. Supra note 131 (describing those barriers).
145. Supra Section II.B.1(i) (explaining that legislators’ intent to entrench themselves is not
unconstitutional). For detailed discussion of when and why governmental motive should matter in First
Amendment analysis, see Kagan, supra note 119, at 505–14 (concluding there are appreciable arguments
why governmental motive is important to First Amendment analysis, but explicitly not endorsing any
claim that motives should be more important to that analysis than a law’s effects).
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mixed. At least one Court opinion has already explained that a law serves
a compelling state interest when legislators enacted the law to advance
two goals: one of which is a compelling state interest and the other of
which is not.146 Granted, the non-compelling motive at issue in that
opinion was not a bad motive. But, per the reasoning in the above
paragraph’s last two sentences, that unlikely makes a difference.
iii. The Threat of Entrenchment Effect Should Not Preclude a
Compelling Interest
A separate possibility is that the campaign finance decisions rejected a
compelling interest in political equality based not on the Court’s concern
that legislators intended to entrench themselves but instead on the concern
that these laws threatened to in fact excessively entrench incumbents.
James Gardner argues “[w]hat may be the strongest slippery slope
challenge to campaign spending restrictions rests on the fear that such
measures, however well-motivated, will have the unintended
consequence of giving incumbents an advantage over challengers so
significant that even the most rudimentary kind of democratic
accountability will be destroyed.”147
But this ground for rejecting a compelling interest in reducing wealthbased political inequality faces doctrinal and practical objections. Take
doctrinal first. For the Court to reject a compelling interest on grounds
that actions advancing that interest could excessively entrench
incumbents logically requires that the Court adopted some judgment of
what constitutes excessive entrenchment.148 That judgment is in tension
with the Court’s having deemed partisan gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable on the ground that the Court has no manageable standards for
deciding how much entrenchment is “too much.”149
146. Justice Kagan’s dissent in Arizona Free Enter. Club made this point, which the majority did
not dispute. Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 782 (2011) (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
147. James Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the
Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 673, 676 (2011) (proceeding to refute this slippery
slope challenge).
148. The Court’s doing so does not require deciding the precise threshold at which entrenchment
becomes excessive. But it logically requires finding that the amount of entrenchment that could plausibly
result from recognizing this compelling interest would be excessive.
149. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2498 (2019); Deborah Hellman, Defining
Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1412–13 (2013). A
counterargument is that Rucho feared the politicization of courts that occurs when courts must repeatedly
make these decisions without manageable standards, Rucho, 139 S.Ct. at 2507, and that rejecting a
compelling interest in political equality once and for all based on entrenchment concerns is not
comparably politicizing. But Rucho presented the Court’s lack of competence to determine what
constitutes excessive entrenchment as a basis for its holding that is seemingly independent from the
concern that adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases would politicize courts. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at
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One practical objection to the Court’s rejecting a compelling interest in
political equality based on a concern about entrenchment effects is that to
do so ignores alternative routes to the same harm: that ninety-five percent
of incumbent candidates between 1980 and 2006 won their elections
shows incumbents are already extremely hard to defeat and there is little
room for First Amendment-impinging laws that advance political equality
to increase incumbent entrenchment.150 And the Court would similarly
ignore alternative routes to entrenchment if its concern were that a law
ostensibly advancing political equality will entrench a political party,
given Levinson and Sachs’ survey of the innumerable strategies that
parties use to entrench themselves.151
Perhaps most important, the claim that legislators may use laws
ostensibly advancing political equality to entrench themselves or their
party tells only half the entrenchment story. Gilens’ data, combined with
the wealthy’s tendency to favor laws that protect and strengthen their
economic and political advantage, shows that preventing legislative
bodies from adjusting imbalances in political power threatens to
perpetuate class entrenchment.152 Barring a compelling interest in
reducing wealth-based political inequality on grounds that this interest
could produce excessive incumbent- or party-entrenchment implicitly
adopts a view that the costs of whatever incumbent- or partyentrenchment such reforms threaten exceed the costs of the class
entrenchment that such reforms could reduce153— a view not obviously
right.
A different way to put the point is to recognize that the concern that
legislators will entrench themselves is a concern that they will cause
themselves to remain in office via some obstruction of the way we want
democracy to function.154 I have in this Article assumed agreement with
2507 (“Any judicial decision on what [constitutes excessive entrenchment would be] beyond the
competence of the federal courts.”).
150. Gardner, supra note 147, at 705–15 (showing that the argument that the threat of excessive
entrenchment justifies barring a compelling interest in political equality suffers four characteristics of
weak slippery slope arguments).
151. Supra note 127 and accompanying text.
152. For one economist’s account of how the wealthy leverage their outsized political influence to
increase their economic advantage, creating a vicious cycle between economic inequality and political
inequality that entrenches the wealthy’s power, see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW
TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 35–104, 119 (2012).
153. See Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses' Constitution: The First Amendment and Class
Entrenchment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161, 2162 (2018).
154. See Levinson & Sachs, supra note 125, at 409 (“[T]he persistence of politicians or parties in
office . . . is not necessarily proof of entrenchment. If politicians [or] parties . . . are retained simply
because they continue to be popular among the electorate, this would not be viewed as entrenchment.
Entrenchment implies that the political system is not responsive to changes in voters' preferences; a system
that is perfectly responsive to unchanging preferences would be viewed as a well-functioning
democracy.”).
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the premise that, in principle, a democracy’s constituents should each
have a roughly equal opportunity to influence political outcomes.155
Arguing that a law that advances wealth-based political equality causes
entrenchment of legislators or of a political party requires showing not
just that the law makes certain legislators or a certain party more likely to
retain office. It requires additionally showing that the law does so by
creating political inequalities along an axis other than wealth such that the
law overall moves us further from the ideal of each constituent having a
roughly equal opportunity to influence political outcomes.
2. No Limiting Principle
Another reason the Court has rejected a compelling interest in political
equality is that the Court has feared that this interest lacks a limiting
principle.156 Indeed, there are countless conceivable ways that certain
entities or persons are positioned to utter speech that disproportionately
influences political outcomes. A leading objection to recognizing a
compelling interest in correcting distortions in political influence is that
this interest could seemingly justify media censorship on grounds that the
press or certain media outlets have disproportionate political influence.157
Other of the many ways persons or groups are unequally situated to
influence political outcomes or to get elected include differences in
wealth, celebrity status,158 cheap leisure time,159 charisma,160 and strength
of group or campaign organization.161
Scholarship elsewhere refutes that this slippery slope concern warrants
rejecting a compelling interest in political equality.162 For this Article’s
purposes, then, it suffices to add that framing the compelling interest that
155. Supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
156. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010); McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 296–97 (2003), (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157. Id.
158. Samuel Gedge, "Wholly Foreign to the First Amendment": The Demise of Campaign
Finance's Equalizing Rationale in Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008), 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1197, 1197–98 (2009).
159. David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1369, 1384 (1994).
160. Strauss, supra note 119, at 521.
161. Id.
162. See generally Gardner, supra note 147; see also, e.g., HASEN, supra note 113, at 117–23
(rebutting slippery-slope-to-censorship argument), 124–45 (rebutting argument concerning slippery slope
to excessive media regulation independent of censorship motive), 146-60 (rebutting slippery-slope-toexcessive-entrenchment argument); cf. Purdy, supra note 153, at 2176 (explaining how doctrines letting
polities impinge on the First Amendment to advance political equality can “be neutral both (1) in the
formal sense that they do not require free-roaming, case-by-case judicial decisions about the distribution
of political power and (2) in the substantive sense that they implement a version of the idea that the state
is obliged not to make invidious distinctions among citizens”).
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justifies union-strengthening laws as an interest in reducing wealth-based
political inequality rather than in advancing political equality more
generally could blunt the edge of the Court’s concern. This narrower
interest could justify only laws that reduce economic inequality’s
transmission into political inequality in a manner consistent with the
Court’s narrow tailoring principles. The foregoing paragraph’s parade of
horribles suggests that there are seemingly much fewer ways that First
Amendment impingements plausibly advance that interest consistent with
narrow tailoring principles than there are ways that such impingements
could, consistent with those principles, reduce any source of political
inequality.
Of course, the Court’s having abstracted the interests recognized by
Nixon and Austin into interests in advancing political equality full-stop
suggests the Court might chafe at recognizing a compelling interest in
wealth-based political equality as distinct from one in political equality
full-stop.163 But scholars have noted the Court could adopt a compelling
interest in combatting certain distortions of political influence without
committing itself to recognizing an interest in combatting other
distortions.164
And the emergence since Buckley of robust data recording incomebased political inequality165 vitiates the Court’s concern that recognizing
an interest in wealth-based political equality would invite First
Amendment-impinging laws that ostensibly advance such equality but
whose efficacy and necessity the Court cannot meaningfully assess.
While I do not here try to hash out the optimal way to use this data to
implement an administrable standard for evaluating such laws’ efficacy
and necessity, this data suggests administrable standards are likely
available. The Court could—similar to how it has in administering its one
person one vote rule166—select some plausible threshold at which
discrepancies in political influence trigger a compelling interest.167 The
163. Supra note 112.
164. Hellman, supra note 149.
165. Supra note 122 and accompanying text.
166. To administer the constitutional requirement of one person one vote, the Court deems
legislative districting schemes presumptively compliant if “the maximum population deviation between
the largest and smallest district is less than 10%.” Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016). This
shows that the Court can and does use plausible and administrable standards to constitutionalize political
equality, even if the Constitution did not itself require the Court to choose whatever standard the Court
selected instead of some other plausible and administrable standard. See Strauss, supra note 159, at 1385
(“‘One person, one vote’ is an example of . . . a workable conception of equality. ‘One person, one vote’
is not the necessary or inevitable rule for voting in a democracy . . . The great virtue of that principle is
[instead] that it is a plausible account of democratic equality that is, relatively speaking, very easy to
administer.”).
167. I do not address whether the Court should use a metric comparing inequalities in political
influence between two points on the income distribution (e.g., a comparison between the 90th and 10th
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Court could then rely on contemporaneous simulations of studies, such as
those discussed earlier in this Article,168 to assess whether that threshold
is exceeded.
Any such standard might be more helpful for proving that the polity
suffers enough wealth-based political inequality to have a compelling
interest in reducing that inequality than for proving that a challenged law
advances that interest.169 But once courts have such a standard for
showing that the state has a compelling interest in reducing such
inequality, courts could likely rely on the type of reasoning and metrics I
consider below in Section III-B to evaluate whether a challenged law
advances that interest.170
III. UNION-STRENGTHENING LAWS ARE PLAUSIBLY ADEQUATELY
TAILORED TO THIS INTEREST.
Recognizing a compelling interest in reducing wealth-based political
inequality would be only the first step in justifying any labor laws the
Court may think impinge on the First Amendment. Next the Court would
need to conclude that those laws are adequately tailored to serving that
interest. This Part begins to develop an analysis of whether unionstrengthening laws are adequately tailored. Although I focus particularly
on showing why public-171 and private sector agency fees are quite
plausibly adequately tailored to that interest, the analysis below could be
transferred to defend other union-strengthening laws by showing how
those laws strengthen unions’ ability to reduce economic inequality and
to organize poor and middle-class people’s political power.172
percentile) or instead a metric that accounts for inequalities in political influence across the whole income
distribution.
168. Section II.A.1.
169. This limitation is particularly apparent for challenged laws that were enacted before the time
periods that the studies collected in Section II.A.1 observed. For such laws, we could not use successive
iterations of those studies to compare the wealth-based political inequality that existed before and after
those laws were enacted.
170. Possibly the Court could even rely on one of those metrics to establish its standard for how
much inequality triggers a compelling interest. The Court might decide that the studies I considered supra
Section II.A.1 satisfactorily establish that economic inequality does, when it exists, transmit into political
inequality. The Court could then choose a certain threshold of economic inequality – perhaps as measured
by the 90/10 ratio or by the Gini coefficient – that triggers a compelling interest in reducing wealth-based
political inequality. This approach would remove any need to run new simulations of the studies
considered supra Section II.A.1 contemporaneously with litigation that questions whether an interest in
reducing wealth-based political inequality justifies a given law.
171. But cf. notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
172. The NLRA requires exclusive representation once a union acquires majority support because
the NLRA’s sponsors believed such representation makes unions more effective advocates for workers.
Nat’l Lab. Relations Bd., Advice Memorandum, Dick’s Sporting Goods, Case 6-CA-34821 (June 22,
2006) at 8. Testing this hypothesis is challenging because U.S. labor law has not experimented with
members-only unions since the NLRA’s enactment and because labor law in countries that allow
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Below, I use the narrow tailoring framework associated with strict
scrutiny although the union-strengthening laws this Article considers
would likely receive sub-strict “exacting” scrutiny.173 I do so mainly
because, particularly if courts extend Americans for Prosperity
Foundation v. Bonta’s174 recent formulation of the standard for exacting
scrutiny beyond the context of laws that compel disclosure, questions and
principles that I explain guide strict scrutiny would also guide a court
deploying exacting scrutiny, with a key difference between strict and
exacting scrutiny being that the latter does not require that challenged
state action be the least restrictive means of achieving the state’s asserted
interest.175 My discussion of less restrictive alternatives below thus does
not imply that governments would need to show that a challenged unionstrengthening law is the least restrictive means to advance the interest in
reducing wealth-based political inequality.
A. Narrow Tailoring Principles
In this Section, I review principles that shape strict scrutiny’s narrow
tailoring inquiry. First, I specify the five questions that the narrow
tailoring inquiry asks of challenged state action. I then discuss four
considerations the Court does or should take into account in answering
those five questions. My discussion reveals principles and sites of
doctrinal uncertainty that will inform any inquiry into whether unionstrengthening laws are adequately tailored to reducing economic
inequality’s transmission into political inequality.
1. Five Overarching Questions
The narrow tailoring inquiry asks five questions.176 First, causation:
members-only unions differs from U.S. labor law in many other ways. Applying this Article’s framework
to challenges to exclusive representation would thus substantially rely on the deference principles
developed infra III.A.4.
In contrast, there is more evidence that sectoral bargaining strengthens unions’ ability to reduce
economic inequality and organize poor and middle-class political power. See Kate Andrias, The New
Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 94 (2016); Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in
a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 631–32 (2007).
Showing that an opt-out unionization regime increases long-term unionization rates would go
far in transferring my analysis below to defend such a regime. Significant evidence supports such a
showing. E.g. supra notes 25–26.
173. Supra note 20.
174. 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021).
175. Id. at 2383, 86–87 (“While exacting scrutiny does not require that disclosure regimes be the
least restrictive means of achieving their ends, it does require that they be narrowly tailored to the
government’s asserted interest.”). Whether and how courts will apply this standard to laws that trigger
exacting scrutiny outside the compelled disclosure context remains to be seen.
176. Here I slightly modify Richard Fallon’s explication by explicitly noting the causality
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does the challenged law advance the state’s compelling interest? Second,
necessity: must the state advance this interest by impinging on First
Amendment rights through the challenged law, or could the state, with
comparable efficacy, advance this interest through means that do not
impinge on, or that less impinge on, those rights?177 Below I refer to such
means as “less restrictive alternatives.” Third, under-inclusiveness: has
the state failed to regulate conduct that poses a threat to the compelling
interest comparable to the threat posed by the conduct that the challenged
law regulates?178 Under-inclusiveness does not necessarily invalidate the
challenged action.179 Fourth is over-inclusiveness. Save for a distinction
not here relevant, the over-inclusiveness inquiry duplicates the necessity
inquiry by asking whether the challenged action impinges on First
Amendment rights more than is necessary to advance the compelling
interest.180 Over-inclusiveness does not necessarily invalidate the
challenged action either.181 Fifth is proportionality. The Court seemingly
has never expressly noted that its narrow tailoring analysis includes a
proportionality inquiry. But scholars have observed that in facing
inevitable questions about how much over- or under-inclusiveness is too
much—particularly in cases where the challenged action merely reduces
rather than eliminates the harm that the state has a compelling interest in
avoiding—courts must conduct an implicit proportionality inquiry to
decide “whether a particular, incremental reduction in risk justifies a
particular impingement of protected rights in light of other reasonably
available, more or less costly and more or less effective, alternatives.”182
2. Efficacy-sensitivity
The Court has never clearly resolved whether a proposed less
restrictive alternative must be as effective as the challenged state action
in advancing the government’s compelling interest—nor whether, if it

requirement that inheres in the necessity requirement. See Fallon, supra note 40, at 1321–31.
177. Id. at 1326.
178. Id. at 1327.
179. Id. at 1327.
180. Id. at 1328–29.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1330–31. Numerous other scholars have likewise noted that the narrow tailoring prong
requires courts to conduct an implicit proportionality analysis. E.g. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 722–23 (1978). And scholars have amply argued why the Court should explicitly
embrace a structured proportionality inquiry when reviewing claims of constitutional rights’ violations.
See generally, e.g., Jamal Greene, Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2018); see also A Shield
for David and a Sword Against Goliath: Protecting Association While Combatting Dark Money Through
Proportionality, 133 HARV. L. REV. 643, 643–45 (2019) (arguing a proportionality approach advances
ends the First Amendment aims to advance).
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need not be as effective, how close is close enough.183 The Court has in
some cases suggested that challenged state action survives strict scrutiny
if the proposed less restrictive alternative less effectively advances the
state’s compelling interest.184 But other times the Court has at least
implicitly indicated that a proposed less restrictive alternative need not as
effectively advance the state’s compelling interest.185
The important point is that a proposed less restrictive alternative’s
being less effective cuts against, even if it does not necessarily bar,
requiring the state to pursue that alternative. And the Court’s lacking any
clear rule for how comparably effective a less restrictive alternative must
be supports scholars’ conclusions that the Court must conduct a relatively
ad-hoc proportionality analysis to decide whether the government must
forego the challenged state action.186 I therefore below provide reasons
why alternative means of advancing the state’s interest in reducing
wealth-based political inequality may be less effective, without trying to
quantify that efficacy gap.
3. Cost-sensitivity
Nor has the Court developed clear standards to evaluate when if ever
the government must pursue a proposed less restrictive alternative that
imposes financial costs that the challenged state action does not. In Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth,187 the Court held that
although students whom a university required to pay fees to support an
extracurricular program that expressed political viewpoints to which
those students objected receive “some First Amendment protection,” the
state need not refund objecting students’ fees, because doing so “could be
so . . . expensive” as to threaten the extracurricular program’s
existence.188 Elsewhere, Justice Breyer has noted that the narrow

183. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 Yale L.J. 3094, 3118–
19 (2015).
184. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 669 (2004) (“The Government’s burden
is . . . to show that a proposed less restrictive alternative . . . is less effective.”); see also id. at 666
(suggesting challenged state action must have “some additional” efficacy relative to proffered alternatives
to withstand strict scrutiny); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (noting, but
without clarifying whether the Court was articulating a necessary or a sufficient condition, that “[t]he
[state action’s] burden on . . . speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as
effective in achieving th[at] [action’s] legitimate purposes”).
185. Sable Commc’ns of Cal. V. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128–30 (1989) (invalidating a complete ban
on indecent phone communications, because “extremely effective” alternative safeguards that “only a few
. . . young people” would circumvent were less restrictive alternatives for serving the state’s interest in
shielding youth from such communications).
186. Supra note 182.
187. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
188. Id. at 232.
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tailoring analysis is sensitive to governmental budgetary pressures—a
point the majority did not dispute.189 And in a case where the government
argued a proposed alternative was too expensive, the Court rejected that
argument not in principle, but instead only after the challenger agreed to
pay for the alternative’s added expense.190
Granted, the Court has elsewhere indicated it might require the
government to pursue a less restrictive alternative even if that alternative
is more expensive than the challenged action.191 Recently, in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,192 the Court mused in dicta that a less
restrictive alternative to requiring objecting employers to fund
employees’ contraceptive coverage might be to require the government to
fund that coverage.193 The Court suggested two conditions must prevail
before it might require the government to pursue any such alternative.
First, the cost of government funding must be “minor when compared
with the overall cost of” the governmental program (there, Obamacare)
of which the challenged state action was part.194 Second, the Court hinted
that requiring the government to pursue an alternative entailing such
minor costs might be improper if that requirement imposed “a whole new
program or burden on the Government.”195
For present purposes, Burwell suggests that the Court may require the
government to pursue an alternative that is costlier than the challenged
state action only if the additional cost is minor. I therefore below offer
reasons why requiring the government to increase taxes to replace a
union-strengthening law’s role in reducing wealth-based political
inequality might impose costs that are more than minor. I do not try
answering here what we should say is the program of which unionstrengthening laws are part—which strict Burwell fidelity would demand
we use as the denominator for determining these costs’ magnitude. Nor
do I try answering whether the changes to tax law necessary to render tax
an as-effective alternative would effectively constitute a new
governmental program or burden.

189. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 688–89 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
cf. U. S. Postal Serv. V. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 135 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (arguing “preventing loss of mail revenues” is a “significant governmental interest”).
190. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2012).
191. See Roy G. Spece, Jr., The Most Effective or Least Restrictive Alternative as the Only
Intermediate and Only Means-Focused Review in Due Process and Equal Protection, 33 VILL. L. REV.
111, 149–50 (1988) (citing examples, but concluding that at some point a proffered less restrictive
alternative’s greater expense bars the Court from requiring the state to pursue it.).
192. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
193. Id. at 728.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 738–39 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy provided a fifth vote for the majority
opinion seemingly subject to this limitation.
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4. Deference to Legislatures’ Predictive Judgments
The Court has advanced no clear rule concerning what deference it
gives to the government’s factual findings concerning causation or
necessity. But a recurring theme is that the Court accords factual findings
substantial deference when those findings amount to predictive
judgments.196 The Court in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC197 explained
that, at least as to Congress’s “predictive judgments” bearing on the
“factual necessity” of challenged state action, the Court will not “reweigh
the evidence de novo” or “replace Congress' factual predictions with [its]
own,” but instead will require only that Congress “has drawn reasonable
inferences based on substantial evidence.”198
Whether Turner’s rule applies of its own force to strict scrutiny is
unclear. Turner and a later opinion applying its rule applied heightened
but not strict scrutiny.199 Nowhere did these opinions purport to limit their
rules to sub-strict heightened review. But even if these rules governed
only sub-strict heightened review, they would seemingly govern
challenges to private sector agency fees and likely any compelled speech
and compelled association challenges to exclusive representation or
sectoral bargaining. For Janus applied only “exacting” scrutiny to agency
fees.200 Although Janus suggested agency fees might warrant strict
scrutiny, the Court would unlikely subject private sector agency fees to
strict scrutiny, because doing so would imperil a range of subsidies and
fees in other contexts.201 And lower courts have repeatedly noted that
exclusive representation would face only exacting scrutiny.202
Furthermore, the Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project203
signaled that deference to predictive judgments is also appropriate during
strict scrutiny. The Court there held it must “grant weight” to Congress’s
“empirical conclusions” in matters concerning national security and

196. The Court in other areas of law similarly accords greater deference to predictive than to nonpredictive empirical conclusions. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S.
87, 98, 103 (1983) (holding that in reviewing administrative agencies’ discretion, a “court must generally
be at its most deferential” when the agency “is making predictions, within its area of . . . expertise, at the
frontiers of science . . . as opposed to [making] simple findings of fact”).
197. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
198. Id. at 665–66; accord McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 165–66 (2003),
overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
199. Turner, 512 U.S. at 635; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 165–66.
200. Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2018).
201. William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 171, 196–201 (2018) (discussing Janus’s implications for bar dues and public university student
activity fees). For argument that agency fee statutes should receive strict scrutiny, see Tang, supra note
37, at 185–90.
202. See supra note 20.
203. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
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foreign affairs, because these are areas where (1) “information can be
difficult to obtain,” and (2) “the impact of certain conduct can be difficult
to assess.”204 At least this latter characteristic echoes Turner’s claim that
courts should reasonably defer to legislative predictive judgments about
the necessity of First Amendment-impinging laws.
True, Holder involved national security—an area where the Court in
many legal contexts is especially deferential to the political branches. But
likewise the Court’s deference to predictive judgments is a theme that
marks other legal contexts.205 There is thus little warrant for limiting
Holder to national security cases rather than reading it to endorse
deference to predictive judgments in strict scrutiny generally, particularly
given that Holder expressly cited the predictive nature of the
congressional judgments as why deference was due.
5. Political Feasibility and the Inside-Outside Problem
We might think that a proposed less-restrictive alternative’s politically
infeasibility should not help a challenged law survive strict scrutiny. If
the state’s interest is truly compelling, this intuition runs, the state’s
electorate and representatives will have sufficient will to enact an
alternative policy that effectively advances that interest. This intuition
seems sensible in many contexts, although its exact logic is unclear.206
But this intuition is misplaced at least when the compelling interest is
combatting distortions in the political process itself.207 The Court has
seemingly never addressed how this intuition would apply in that context.
But it would be odd for the Court to assume that the political infeasibility
204. Id. at 34–35.
205. Supra note 191.
206. The intuition embodies an evidentiary and a predictive principle. The evidentiary principle is
that a less restrictive alternative’s being politically infeasible discredits the claim that the asserted interest
is compelling because that infeasibility is probative that the polity’s electorate and elected representatives
do not widely and deeply view the interest that the alternative and challenged action advance to be
exceedingly important. But whether the polity’s weak attachment to that interest discredits the claim that
this interest is compelling for strict scrutiny purposes is unclear. Because constitutional rights check
majoritarianism, what makes an interest compelling for strict scrutiny purposes unlikely reduces to how
many of the polity’s members deem the interest terribly important. If, however, we conceive the
compelling interest analysis as examining certain (ostensibly) objective indicia of an interest’s weight –
such as the interest’s relevance to a society’s ability to properly function, see supra note 40 (noting Court
has not clarified what makes an interest compelling) – a polity’s weak attachment to the interest could
conceivably be probative that the interest is not compelling.
The predictive principle is that the interest’s being compelling discredits the claim that a less
restrictive alternative is politically infeasible. That is, because the interest is compelling – regardless of
what exactly makes it compelling – the polity will surely muster the will to enact the alternative if the
Court invalidates the challenged action.
207. The narrow tailoring prong’s cost-sensitivity arguably shows that, even in other contexts, the
Court has not reflexively assumed that a polity’s lacking the political will to enact a proposed less
restrictive alternative discredits that the interest is compelling.
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of a proposed alternative for reducing wealth-based political inequality
discredits the claim that a polity’s members widely and deeply view that
interest as compelling,208 after the Court recognized this to be a
compelling interest on the ground that such inequality impedes
legislatures’ enacting laws that have widespread and deep support in the
polity. Alternatively, it would be odd for the Court to assume that the
importance of reducing wealth-based political inequality will persuade
the wealthy to not render a proposed less restrictive alternative politically
infeasible by organizing their opposition to that alternative. Either of the
above assumptions would suffer from the “inside/outside fallacy”: the
phenomenon whereby a legal theory first diagnoses a problem caused by
certain actors’ having certain motives and then prescribes a solution to
that problem that assumes those same actors lack those same motives.209
The tailoring prong in this context should instead be sensitive to how the
wealthy’s undue influence can block a state from enacting a proposed less
restrictive alternative.
The Court should exercise this sensitivity in at least two ways. These
two considerations should not hand the government a trump card to
defend laws that reduce wealth-based political inequality. But these
considerations should at least make the Court pause before striking down
such laws in cases where it is highly contested that there is even any First
Amendment impingement.210 Again, Janus was such a case. So would be
any challenge to private sector agency fees, public- or private sector
exclusive representation, or private sector sectoral bargaining.
First, the Court should not assume that a state that has overcome the
wealthy’s influence to enact a challenged law can again overcome that
influence, if the Court invalidates that law, to enact an alternative. Given
Gilens’ data, we can expect economically redistributive laws to often be
products of fragile, fleeting political coalitions. Any of various reasons
might explain why a winning coalition converged around one means (Law
One) rather than another (Law Two) for reducing wealth-based political
inequality. But even if a coalition could have prevailed to enact Law Two
when Law One was enacted, that would not mean that the coalition could
prevail to enact Law Two later. Contingent conditions that at Time One
opened a policy window to challenge the wealthy’s influence may lapse
by Time Two.

208. See also supra note 206 (questioning that claim’s relevance).
209. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
1743, 1744–45 (2013).
210. Cf. Purdy, supra note 153, at 2185 (“Institutions that balance the power of wealth by enabling
working people to combine for effective advocacy–in collective bargaining and in the broader contests of
politics–should be assumed to be compatible with First Amendment interests unless there is a very strong
showing to the contrary.”).
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That our federal and state governments structurally tend toward inertia
further suggests that the battle to replace Law One with Law Two would
likely wage uphill. Our federal and state governments split
decisionmaking among three branches, and divided the legislative branch
into two houses,211 partly to make enacting legislation more difficult. And
some scholars have argued that the degree of gridlock our federal and
state governments currently suffer exceeds even what federal and state
constitutional framers intended. Jack Balkin, for instance, argues that
“when combined with today's highly polarized political parties, veto
points that once promoted bargaining and compromise now produce
intransigence and gridlock.”212 Again, the wealthy are disproportionately
able to use these veto points to block policies they disfavor through
strategic campaign spending, lobbying, and their involvement in
regulatory processes.213
Second, the Court should consider whether evidence that a proposed
alternative would more effectively reduce wealth-based political
inequality should counsel to some extent against requiring the state to
pursue that alternative. For we might expect the wealthy to even more
fiercely resist a more effective alternative, further reducing the state’s
chances of enacting that alternative to replace a challenged law. Although
it is unclear exactly when the Court should refuse to require a less
restrictive alternative on grounds that the alternative would be too
effective and therefore politically unfeasible, I hope it will seem obvious
that the particular tax and transfer regime I discuss in Section III-C(2) is
one example of where the Court should so refuse.
B. Causation
There are two analytically distinct but mutually reinforcing ways
whereby unions mitigate wealth-based inequalities in political
influence.214 First, by organizing low-income and middle-class people to
countervail the wealthy’s political power in influencing public policy.
Second, by reducing economic inequalities. In turn there are two
analytically distinct but mutually reinforcing ways that unions reduce
economic inequalities. First, through their above-mentioned organizing
of political power to shape public policy—a function I below call
211. Except for Nebraska, where the legislature is unicameral.
212. Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System Is Dysfunctional,
94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1165 (2014).
213. Andrias, supra note 43, at 472, 484; see also id. at 455 (noting that business interests “tend to
contribute strategically to members of both parties in order to obtain influence over key chokeholds,” and
providing examples of strategic giving to legislative committee members).
214. These correspond to two of the four possible approaches to reducing wealth-based political
inequality noted infra notes 249-250 and accompanying text.
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“political advocacy.”215 Second, via collective bargaining with
employers—through which unions increase the compensation workers
receive.
1. Organizing Countervailing Political Power
We can reasonably expect that the public policies unions advance by
organizing low-income and middle-class people’s political power would
include economically redistributive policies. And below I offer examples
showing this is so. But insofar as the state’s compelling interest is
reducing economic inequality’s transmission into political inequality—
rather than reducing economic inequality because economic inequality is
per se bad—evidence that unions increase lawmakers’ responsivity to
low-income and middle-class voters’ political preferences, and that a
challenged union-strengthening law helps unions do so, should suffice to
establish that that law advances the state’s compelling interest, even
absent evidence showing that unions advance economic equality.
And Gilens offers evidence that unions increase that responsivity. After
noting that strong interest groups can mitigate wealth-based political
inequality, he concludes that “unions are among the most important
political forces moving federal policy in a direction desired by the less
well-off.”216 This finding does not surprise. For Gilens found that unions
rank among the interest groups in the United States whose policy
positions most strongly positively correlate with the “preferences of the
less well-off.”217 And not only do unions align themselves with these
positions, but unions have organized low-income and middle-class
persons on a scale greater than any other non-party group, helping unions
persuade lawmakers to turn these preferences into policy.218 Indeed,
multiple studies show a correlation between union density and legislators’
votes for the positions unions advocate.219
But do agency fees strengthen unions’ political advocacy? Evidence
suggests yes, even though agency fees cover only costs relating to
collective bargaining and contract administration. A recent study
concluded that agency fees do so after controlling for other relevant
differences between so-called right to work states (i.e., states that bar

215. I use this shorthand while mindful that, per Janus, collective bargaining is also in a sense
political advocacy.
216. Gilens, supra note 45, at 157–58.
217. Id. at 157.
218. Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE
L.J. 148, 168–69 (2013) (noting that labor unions at their peak represented over one-third of the country’s
wage earners).
219. See id. at 171 & notes 100–03 (collecting studies).
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agency fees) and agency fee states.220 That conclusion is unsurprising
considering that right-to-work laws force unions to shift resources from
political advocacy and voter turnout to efforts to persuade workers to pay
their fair share of union representation.221
Beyond that study’s finding that right-to-work laws force unions to
redirect money that unions could have spent on political advocacy, other
research suggests right-to-work laws reduce the amount of money even
initially available for unions’ political advocacy. One study shows that
public sector workers in agency fee states were more than twice as likely
to be union members than were public sector workers in right-to-work
states.222 Union members, unlike non-members, pay dues to fund not only
the union’s costs of collective bargaining and contract administration but
also the union’s political advocacy.223 This study therefore means public
sector workers in agency fee states were more than twice as likely to
financially support unions’ political advocacy than such workers in rightto-work states.
There are reasons to think agency fees might cause some of, not merely
correlate with, that higher rate of union membership. First, there is
substantial, albeit contested, evidence that agency fees make unions more
effective in their workplace representation.224 And workers are likely
more willing to pay a union to represent their interests outside the
workplace once they have seen that unions can powerfully represent their
interests inside the workplace.225 Second, the marginal cost to workers of
paying membership dues is lower in agency fee states than in right-towork states, because these workers’ alternative to paying membership
dues is to pay an agency fee, rather than to pay nothing. These workers
are therefore more likely to pay membership dues to fund the union’s
political advocacy and to gain other membership benefits. Third, free
riding in right-to-work states can drive union membership below a

220. James Feigenbaum, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, & Vanessa Williamson, From the
Bargaining Table to the Ballot Box: Political Effects of Right to Work Laws (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 24259, 2018). The study found right to work laws reduced county-level democratic
vote shares in in federal and state elections. Id. at 4. Part of this effect seemingly owes to right-to-work
laws’ decreasing voter turnout by reducing unions’ ability to mobilize voters. See id. at 11–15. The study
also found evidence suggesting that right-to-work laws reduce economically redistributive state policy
and reduce the number of state legislators from working class backgrounds, although the authors’ ability
to show that right to work laws cause not merely correlate with these outcomes was limited. Id. at 19–23.
221. See id. at 6, 16.
222. Elizabeth McNichol, Weaker Unions Could Mean More Income Inequality in States, CENTER
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (March 6, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/weaker-unions-couldmean-more-income-inequality-in-states.
223. Supra note 142.
224. Infra notes 243-244.
225. See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy
Advice, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 173, 177–79 (2013) (arguing so).
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majority of a collective bargaining unit, increasing the union’s
vulnerability to decertification.226
2. Advancing Economic Equality
Economists and sociologists have offered evidence that unions also
advance economic equality. Unions reduce economic inequality through
collective bargaining by causing employers to increase workers’ overall
compensation. Studies have found that the average income for unionized
employees exceeds that for non-unionized employees by ten to twenty
percent.227 Indeed, studies have shown that unions can weaken
employers’ power to drive down wages in monopsonized labor
markets.228 That is, markets in which employers insufficiently compete
with each other to attract workers—markets that many recent studies
conclude are increasingly common. Although some economists have
argued that unions cause non-unionized workers’ compensation to
decrease and in this sense exacerbate economic inequality, other
economists have concluded that unions can increase non-unionized
workers’ compensation. One way unions do so is by causing non-union
employers to raise wages to disincentivize their employees from
unionizing.229
Granted, some researchers have questioned the relationship that many
studies find between collective bargaining and economic equality. These
researchers argue that recent decades’ increases in economic inequality
owe little to unions’ declining strength—or at least less to that decline
than to technological change that raises demand for so-called skilled
labor.230
226. Janet C. Hunt & Rudolph A. White, The Effects of Right-to-Work Legislation on Union
Outcomes: Additional Evidence, 4 J. LAB. RES. 47–63 (1983).
227. E.g. Henry S. Farber et al., Unions and Inequality over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence
from Survey Data 19–24 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 24587, 2018) (finding that union
wage premium has steadily stayed within this range over past eighty years); Brantly Callaway & William
J. Collins, Unions, Workers, and Wages at the Peak of the American Labor Movement, in EXPLORATIONS
IN ECONOMIC HISTORY, 95, 112–14 (Elsevier Vol. 68(c), 2018).
228. E.g. Efraim Benmelech et al., Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer
Concentration Affect Wages? 16 (U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 24307,
2018).
229. Mathieu Taschereau-Dumouchel, The Union Threat, SOC’Y FOR ECON. DYNAMICS MEETING
PAPERS (2011); Henry S. Farber, Nonunion Wage Rates and the Threat of Unionization, 58 INDUS. &
LAB. RELATIONS REV. 335 (2005).
230. Compare, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion, Deunionization, Technical Change, and
Inequality 251 in 55 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONFERENCE SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY 229 (2001)
(concluding that “although [such technological change rather than] deunionization” is “the primary cause
of the surge in wage inequality,” deunionization “amplifies the original effect of skill-biased technical
change by removing the wage compression imposed by unions”); with Ömer Tuğrul Açıkgöz & Barış
Kaymak, The Rising Skill Premium and Deunionization, 63 J. MONETARY ECON. 37, 38 (2014)
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But recent research plumbing new data sources suggests collective
bargaining has exerted a powerful causal impact on economic
inequality.231 And evidence suggests unions advance economic equality
not only through collective bargaining but also through their political
advocacy. Unions were arguably the most powerful political force that led
to Congress’s enacting Medicare and minimum wage increases since
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938.232 Again, studies
show a correlation between union density and legislators’ votes for the
policies unions advocate, including redistributive tax and social welfare
positions.233
Whether unions reduce wealth-based political inequality by reducing
economic inequality—rather than just by causing lawmakers to better
respond to non-economically-redistributive political preferences held by
low-income and middle-class people—almost surely depends on whether
unions reduce economic inequality between economic brackets that
possess unequal political influence. A detailed analysis of that question is
outside this Article’s scope. But evidence suggests unions do.
Gilens found that, at the federal level, people at the ninetieth income
percentile possess political influence dominating that of people at the
seventieth, fiftieth, thirtieth, and tenth percentiles. 234 Even were the
government’s interest only in reducing the economic (and thus political)
power of people at or above the ninetieth economic percentile, studies
suggest unions do so by reducing the ninety/ten ratio235 and top ten
percent’s income share.236 These findings are likely supported by separate
studies finding that private sector unions redistribute profits from firm

(concluding that unions have little effect on the equilibrium wage distribution).
231. Farber et al., supra note 227, at 2–3, 24, 32–33. These authors further argue that researchers’
tendency to emphasize the causal impact on inequality of supply and demand for so-called skilled labor,
rather than of unionization, may owe to the fact that micro-level data is more readily available for persons’
education status before 1973 than for persons’ union membership status before that year. These authors
use a new source of micro-level data documenting union membership status over the past 80 years.
232. Sachs, supra note 218, at 170–71; THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 18
(2d ed. 2000) (noting that organized labor was “the most powerful single source of pressure” in the fight
to enact Medicare).
233. Supra note 218.
234. Supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text.
235. This ratio compares the 90th percentile income to the 10th percentile income.
236. Farber et al, supra note 227, at 32–33 (finding the “rise (decline) in union density between
1940–1960 (1970–2004) can explain” approximately 5-15% of the “decline (rise) in the 90/10 ratio”); id.
at 4 (finding increasing union density decreases top ten percent’s income share).
One might worry that people at the 99th or 99.9th percentile could independently dominate
politics if only the power of people at the 90th percentile were reduced. Were that so, research assessing
unions’ ability to reduce economic inequality between persons at the 99th or 99.9th percentile and other
percentiles would help assess how much unions reduce wealth-based political inequality by reducing
economic inequality as opposed to by causing lawmakers to better respond to non-economicallyredistributive political preferences held by low-income and middle-class people.
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managers237 and shareholders238 to workers. Public sector unions of
course do not similarly redirect money from shareholders and firm
managers through collective bargaining. Toward assessing how much
public sector unions reduce the ninety/ten ratio and top ten percent share,
future research could disaggregate how much unions reduce the
ninety/ten ratio and top ten percent income share through political
advocacy rather than through collective bargaining.
In light of findings that the middle class has disproportionate political
influence relative to the poor at the state level, 239 unions’ recorded impact
on the Gini coefficient,240 which summarizes inequality across the entire
income distribution,241 might further demonstrate that unions advance
economic equality between groups with disparate political influence.
Research showing that public sector unions lift people into the middleclass brackets that enjoy state-level political influence could be a way—
separate from demonstrating public sector unions’ impact on the
ninety/ten ratio or top ten percent income share—to show that public
sector unions reduce wealth-based political inequality by reducing
economic inequality.
How do agency fees help unions advance economic equality? The
extent to which agency fees improve union density and unions’ ability to
increase workers’ compensation through collective bargaining is
uncertain.242 Studies that have controlled for variables correlating with
237. John DiNardo et al., Unions and the Labor Market for Managers 17, 23, (Inst. Lab. Econ,
IZA Discussion Paper No. 150, 2000) (concluding “the pay of managers or related occupations is reduced
by about 5 to 7 percent in an industry that is completely unionized compared to one that is non-union”).
238. See, e.g., David Lee & Alexandre Mas, Long-Run Impacts of Unions on Firms: New Evidence
from Financial Markets, 1961–1999, 127 Q. J. LAB. ECON. 333, 334–35 (presenting data indicating
shareholders expect unionization to decrease their dividends by approximately ten percent). Evaluating
how redistributing profits from shareholders to workers impacts economic inequality would require
assessing the portion of income that different economic brackets receive from shareholdings, including
through institutional investors. I do not try to assess that. But the outsized share of stock and mutual fund
assets that the top 1% and top 10% of wealth-holders own suggests that unions’ redistributing wealth from
shareholders to workers would reduce the most wealthy’s economic (and so political) power. See Edward
N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962-2013: What Happened over the Great
Recession? 2 RUSSEL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 6, 37 tbl.5 (2016) (showing that as of 2013, the top 1%
of the wealth distribution hold 49.8% of stock and mutual fund assets. And accounting for indirect
ownership through retirement plans and similar accounts, the top 10% own 81.4% of those assets.).
239. Supra note 55.
240. See Farber et al., supra note 227 at 32–33 (finding the “rise (decline) in union density between
1940–1960 (1970–2004) can explain” between approximately five and fifteen percent of the “decline
(rise) in the . . . Gini coefficient[]”).
241. The Gini coefficient is a way to provide an aggregate summary of income or wealth inequality
across all income percentiles in a population.
242. See generally William J. Moore, The Determinants and Effects of Right-To-Work Laws: A
Review of the Recent Literature, 19 J. LAB. RES. 445 (1998) (reviewing literature assessing right-to-work
laws’ impact on these outcomes and discussing methodological difficulties such studies face).
That European labor unions rely less than do U.S. unions on agency fees yet have been more
powerful does not imply that abolishing agency fees in the U.S. won’t substantially weaken unions. For
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right-to-work laws have found that agency fees increase both union
density243 and unions’ ability to secure higher compensation for workers
through collective bargaining,244 although conflicting studies exist as to
both of these metrics of agency fees’ impact.245
But there is precedent for deferring to legislative judgments, in the face
of conflicting studies, that agency fees significantly impact these
metrics—at least under the exacting scrutiny that Janus applied to public
sector agency fees and that private sector agency fees would likely receive
if the Court found those fees impinge on the First Amendment.246
Moreover, even if right-to-work laws did not impact union density or
unions’ ability to improve workers’ compensation through collective
bargaining, studies have explained why agency fees make unions less
effective in advancing economic equality through their political
advocacy.247 Legislatures thus have strong grounds for concluding that
agency fees advance economic equality.
C. Necessity: Why Not Just Tax and Transfer?
Why aren’t other policies adequate alternatives for reducing economic
inequality’s transmission into political equality? Ganesh Sitaraman has
ordered approaches to reducing this transmission into four analytical
categories.248 First, countering economic inequality directly through
policies that impede people’s ability to amass excessive economic power

European labor law systems include many tools for strengthening labor unions that U.S. labor law lacks.
Brishen Rogers, Three Concepts of Workplace Freedom of Association, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
177, 212–16 (2016) (concluding “[agency fees] . . . are superfluous in Europe, but essential in the United
States”).
243. E.g. David T. Ellwood & Glenn Fine, The Impact of Right-to-Work Laws on Union
Organizing, 95 J. POL. ECON. 250, 250–73 (1987) (attributing to right to work laws an eight percent
decline in union density); but see Moore, supra note 242, at 449–53 (discussing contrary studies and
concluding “whether or not [right-to-work] laws reduce unionization remains an open question”).
244. E.g. Henry S. Farber, Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence between the
Public and Private Sectors 25–26 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 503,
2005) (finding that allowing agency fees increases unionized workers’ earnings by 3.7 percent without
impacting non-unionized workers’ earnings); Gasper A. Garofalo & Devinder M. Malhotra, An Integrated
Model of the Economic Effects of Right To Work Laws, 13 J. LAB. RES. 293 (1992) (accounting for unions’
impact on wages both directly through collective bargaining and indirectly through productivity effects,
and finding that right to work laws have large negative effect on wages); Thomas M. Carroll, Right to
Work Laws Do Matter, 50 S. ECON. J. 2, 499–502 (1983) (same); but see Moore, supra note 242, at 458–
60 (discussing studies finding right to work laws do not significantly affect wages).
245. Supra notes 242-243.
246. Supra notes 200–201 and accompanying text; see Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 394–95 (2000) (applying exacting scrutiny and deferring, in the face of conflicting studies, to
legislative determination that large campaign contributions can corrupt our political system).
247. Supra notes 216–226, 232–233.
248. Sitaraman, supra note 91, at 1508-30.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/4

46

Taylor: Political Equality and First Amendment Challenges to Labor Law

2021]

POLITICAL EQUALITY

551

in the first place.249 Second, safeguarding the political process from the
transmission of that economic power—once it arises—into
disproportionate political power. Third—a sub-species of the second—
incorporating countervailing powers into the political process. Fourth,
“bypassing the political process,” including by trying to create a
bureaucracy insulated from political influence.250
Other scholarship explains shortcomings of approaches to
safeguarding the political process, such as campaign finance regulation
and lobbying reform, that do not build countervailing political power—
including those approaches’ shortcomings relative to labor law
strategies.251 Likewise other scholarship explains shortcomings of efforts
to insulate bureaucracy from the wealthy’s influence.252 I do not further
address such strategies.
I instead begin to analyze whether the possibility of countering
economic inequality directly through policies that do not impinge on the
First Amendment means First Amendment-impinging labor laws
(assuming arguendo those laws impinge on the Amendment) are
inadequately tailored to reducing wealth-based political inequality. Below
I begin this analysis only for tax and transfer because the argument that
tax and transfer constitutes a less restrictive alternative is the most
intuitive and because insights from my discussion of tax and transfer
apply to evaluating whether other vehicles for directly reducing economic
inequality are less restrictive alternatives.
I draw on principles discussed in Section III.A to explain why union249. Leading examples of such policy vehicles include tax, antitrust, corporate governance,
common law rules of property and contract, id., and education policy.
250. Id. at 1526–30.
251. For literature documenting how political actors bypass campaign finance restrictions by
devising new forms of political spending that the law has not anticipated or reached, see sources collected
in Sachs, supra note 218, at 207 & notes 8–9 and 164 & notes 60–62. For an argument that campaign
finance regulations are, partly for that reason, less effective at remedying wealth-based political inequality
than are laws that facilitate poor- and middle-class persons’ organizing, see id. at 164–68; cf. Levinson,
supra note 68, at 136–37.
The Court’s so far rejecting any compelling interest in political equality has further limited
campaign finance regulations’ efficacy for reducing wealth-based political inequality. Even if the Court
now found that a political equality interest justified campaign finance restrictions that the Court previously
held violate the First Amendment, and even if those restrictions were as effective as union-strengthening
laws in reducing wealth-based political inequality, that holding would not render those restrictions less
restrictive alternatives to union-strengthening laws because that holding would not overrule the Court’s
holding that those regulations impinge on the First Amendment.
For arguments that using heightened judicial review to invalidate laws that the wealthy unduly
influenced would be an ineffective way to reduce wealth-based political inequality, see generally Einer
R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31; see
Andrias, supra note 43, at 491–93; Levinson, supra note 68, at 114–16, 118–20.
252. E.g., Levinson, supra note 68, at 113–18. Even if we could insulate bureaucracy from the
wealthy’s influence, agencies’ dependence on congressional authorization to act would limit the extent to
which agencies could reduce wealth-based inequality.
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strengthening laws are plausibly adequately tailored to reducing wealthbased political inequality, despite the option of pursuing that goal through
tax and transfer. At my argument’s heart is the fact that unions, unlike tax,
reduce wealth-based political inequality through both Sitaraman’s first
and third mechanisms: countering economic inequality directly and
incorporating countervailing power into the political process.
This fact helps explain why a mixed regulatory approach that relies on
both progressive taxation and strong unions can be a more effective
strategy for reducing economic inequality than an approach that tries to
replace strong unions with increased taxation. To show that, I argue that
although there are tax reforms that could advance economic equality as
well as could any union-strengthening law if those tax reforms are
enacted, adequately enforced, never later weakened or repealed, and
updated over time to adopt to changing circumstances, we can expect the
wealthy to organize to lengthen the odds of realizing those conditions.
Because unions organize countervailing political power that can help
resist the wealthy’s efforts to repeal or weaken redistributive taxation,253
a strategy for reducing economic inequality that relies partly on unionstrengthening laws will likely be more effective in the long run than a
strategy that substitutes increased taxation for those laws.
That unions organize countervailing political power might not be a
reason to rely on union-strengthening laws to reduce economic inequality
if lawmakers could enact and implement what I will call a “circuitbreaking tax regime”—that is, a tax regime that would sufficiently reduce
economic inequality at Time One to eliminate concern about a wealthy
class that has both the incentive and disproportionate political power to
repeal or weaken that tax strategy at Time Two. 254 But I show that it
would be both likely impossible and possibly undesirably expensive to
try to enact such a regime.
Finally, so long as a circuit-breaking tax regime is untenable, a
regulatory approach that substituted increased taxation for unionstrengthening laws could be less effective than a mixed regulatory
approach at reducing wealth-based political inequality even were I wrong
that this approach would be less effective over time than a mixed
regulatory approach at reducing economic inequality. For if substituting
increased taxation for strong unions can fully compensate for unions’
impact on economic inequality but cannot reduce economic inequality
enough to prevent wealth-based political inequalities from exceeding
253. Supra Section III.B.1.
254. I need not here pin down exactly what would constitute such reform. Conceptually, we would
need to decide what level of wealth-based distortion in political influence triggers a compelling interest.
We would then face empirical difficulty in determining how much economic inequality would cause our
democracy to leap that threshold.
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whatever level triggers a compelling interest,255 unions’ function of
organizing countervailing political power will combat those political
inequalities in a way that such increased taxation does not.
1. Progressive Tax’s Atrophy
A court would reach this tailoring analysis only after agreeing that
economic inequality gives economic elites undue political influence.
Once legislatures enact progressive taxation, we can reasonably expect
that economic elites will try to leverage that influence to repeal or modify
that taxation. Political scientists have recorded these elites’ successful
efforts to do so. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson argue that groups favoring
tax cuts have failed in recent decades to generate broad or salient public
support for such tax cuts; since at least the 1980s, tax cut politics have
instead been largely driven by organizations like the Club for Growth and
Americans for Tax Reform that have relatively small, but unusually
wealthy, memberships.256 This extraordinary wealth begets extraordinary
campaign funding: Club for Growth was the primary funder, aside from
the Republican Party, of Republican candidates in the 2002 midterm
elections.257 These organizations have successfully leveraged a strategy
of conditioning that campaign funding on candidates’ pledges to cut or
not raise taxes—a strategy particularly targeting candidates on the
congressional committees that are most influential in enacting tax cuts.258
This strategy has enabled these organizations to achieve multiple
upwardly-redistributive federal tax cuts since the 2000s.259
Sure, we can expect the wealthy to similarly organize to weaken or
repeal union-strengthening laws. But, again, labor unions, unlike tax, not
only advance economic equality but also build resistance to the wealthy’s
repeal efforts by simultaneously organizing countervailing political
power. And tax law’s highly technical nature may make it easier to reduce
tax laws’ progressivity in ways ordinary voters cannot easily see than it is
to as-stealthily weaken unions through legislation or regulations.260 Even
255. Supra notes 166–167 (explaining the Court need only select some plausible threshold at which
wealth-based political inequalities trigger a compelling interest, even if a different threshold would also
have been plausible).
256. JACOB S. HACKER AND PAUL PIERSON, Tax Politics and the Struggle over Activist
Government, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE
OF CONSERVATISM 256, 267–68 (Theda Skocpol & Paul Pierson, eds., 2007); see also SPENCER PISTON,
CLASS ATTITUDES IN AMERICA 57 (2018) (similar); but cf. generally MICHAEL GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO,
DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2011) (arguing the 2001
estate tax repeal enjoyed substantial support across economic classes).
257. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 256.
258. Id. at 268.
259. Id. at 270–72.
260. See id. at 271–72 (explaining “tax-cut advocates have learned how to design policies in ways
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were tax law and labor law equally susceptible to being weakened over
time by the wealthy’s political efforts, the wealthy might have a harder
time repealing economically-redistributive laws in two different policy
domains than in one. For all these reasons, a mixed regulatory approach
that supplements tax strategies with labor law strategies could be more
effective at advancing economic equality over time than an approach that
relies solely on tax.
2. Circuit-breaking Tax Is Likely Impossible
A circuit-breaking tax regime261 could, in theory, obviate concern
that the wealthy will leverage their disproportionate strength to weaken
or repeal progressive tax reforms. But the first reason to not require the
government to pursue a circuit-breaking tax regime as a less restrictive
alternative to union-strengthening laws is that such a regime is likely
impossible to enact.
i. The Inside-Outside Problem
The very problem a circuit-breaking tax regime would aim to address
likely renders that regime unattainable. Again, determining how
redistributive a tax regime must be to be circuit-breaking is both
conceptually and empirically difficult.262 But it seems reasonable to
assume that circuit-breaking tax reform would need to be of a magnitude
that the wealthy’s current outsized political power would render
politically infeasible.263 And again, the tailoring inquiry should be
sensitive to this reality when the compelling interest at issue is reducing
economic inequality’s distortion of political influence.264
ii. Tax Hydraulics
Tax hydraulics further cast doubt on a government’s ability to effect
circuit-breaking tax reform. By “hydraulics,” I refer to the process by
which people and firms develop strategies to achieve their goals while
paying less in taxes.265
that make tax cuts look much smaller and more equitable” than they are); supra note 60 and accompanying
text (arguing a policy area’s complexity can increase the wealthy’s political influence therein).
261. Supra note 254 and accompanying text.
262. Id.
263. Cf. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, 18 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 61, 70 & n.38 (2017) (noting wealthy’s influence over tax policy undermines premise that
tax-and-transfer is interchangeable with “embedded ‘pre-distributive’ policies such as labor law”).
264. Supra Section III.A.5.
265. David Landau, Political Support and Structural Constitutional Law, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1069,
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Through tax hydraulics, people and firms can exploit and even create
tax loopholes.266 Although lawmakers sometimes intentionally
incorporate so-called “loopholes” into tax laws to satisfy lobbyists, many
tax loopholes were unintended by lawmakers. Scholars have suggested
unintended loopholes are unavoidable.267 Loopholes might result when
different parts of the tax code interact in unforeseen ways268—interactions
that tax codes, due to their length and complexity, are susceptible to.
Loopholes might alternatively result when tax rules are unintentionally
underinclusive. This under-inclusiveness can occur when lawmakers
could not think of or feasibly specify all the transactions to which they
could apply a given tax rule269 or when a technology or business strategy
arises after the tax was enacted to which the tax does not apply.270
The problem of the “uncommon becoming common” marks one
systematic way in which tax laws are particularly vulnerable to underinclusiveness. Lawmakers often tailor laws to only common
circumstances. This is because uncommon circumstances are harder to
foresee and, even if lawmakers do foresee them, the benefits of
appropriately regulating a rare occurrence may not justify the costs of
developing a more complex law.271 Yet when lawmakers take this
approach to crafting tax law, taxpayers often learn that they can modify
their behavior to achieve their goals via thereto uncommon—thereafter
common—transactions or business strategies that lawmakers left
undertaxed.272
The extraordinary income that managers of hedge funds and private
equity firms enjoy offers one illustration.273 The large fees these managers
1075 (2016) (“The tax area is a clear example [of the hydraulics problem]: the complexity of the system
often allows regulated entities and their lawyers to develop alternative strategies that achieve roughly the
same goal as the path that has been shut down and without a substantial change in cost or other
inconvenience.”).
266. An uncontested definition of ‘tax loophole’ eludes commentators. See generally Heather M.
Field, A Taxonomy for Tax Loopholes, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 545 (2018). I use the term (sometimes
redundantly qualified with ‘unintended’) to denote tax advantages lawmakers did not intend to permit or
create.
267. Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339,
366 (2005).
268. Sheldon D. Pollack, Arenas of Federal Tax Policy, 135 TAX NOTES 1499, 1505–06 (2012).
269. Logue, supra note 267, at 365–66.
270. Field, supra note 266, at 554.
271. David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 868 (1999).
272. Id. at 863–64, 869 (1999) (illustrating via partnership income tax rules); see also Logue, supra
note 266, at 366 (“[W]hat was a potentially small loophole with relevance to only a few transactions, and
thus not worth worrying about, becomes a large loophole as enterprising tax advisors funnel money and
clients through such gaps.”).
273. For other examples of tax hydraulics, see Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer,
Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 874, 876–77 (2003) (noting how the companies that venture capitalists finance issue convertible
preferred stock “to shield incentive compensation from . . . ordinary income rates, so managers can enjoy
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earn for investing other people’s money is taxed not at the income tax rate
but instead at a much lower capital gains rate, due to partnership tax
legislation and regulations that Congress and the IRS enacted before these
types of firms were widespread.274 Although the preferential tax treatment
these managers receive thanks to these laws is widely deemed
indefensible,275 legislative history does not indicate Congress and
regulators intended these laws to bequeath a windfall.276 On the contrary,
some commentary suggests that these laws resulted from a routine
extension of longstanding partnership tax principles.277 Indeed, the
comparatively minor role that hedge funds and private equity firms played
in our economy when these laws were enacted calls into question the
extent to which Congress and regulators could have foreseen the
extraordinary incomes that these laws would abet.
Tax hydraulics may imperil lawmakers’ ability to effect circuitbreaking tax reform especially given the rise, particularly since the midtwentieth century, of an “income defense industry” of skilled
professionals whom the wealthy can hire to resist taxes and other
regulations.278 Government regulators have trouble staying ahead of this
industry, whose members compete aggressively to find ways to minimize
clients’ tax burdens.279
Analyzing the potential cost-efficacy of approaches that governments
could take to limit this industry’s ability to impede tax strategies for
advancing economic equality is beyond this Article’s scope. My limited
point here is that whereas the inside-outside problem suggests
governments could unlikely amass political will to even try to enact a
circuit-breaking tax regime, tax hydraulics suggest any such attempt to
enact that regime might fail.

. . . a preferential tax rate”); Sloan G. Speck, Tax Planning and Policy Drift, 69 TAX L. REV. 549 (2016)
at 559, 575 (discussing corporate inversions and the estate and gift tax).
274. Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political
Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States, 38 POL. & SOC. 152, 170
(2010) (discussing hedge funds); EILEEN APPLEBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK:
WHEN WALL STREET MANAGES MAIN STREET 272–75 (2014) (private equity firms).
275. Applebaum & Batt, supra note 274.
276. See Dean Galaro, Gregory Crespi, The Carried Interest Standoff: Reaffirming Executive
Agency Authority, 70 S.M.U. L. REV. 153, 158–160.
277. David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715,
750 (2008).
278. DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP: HOW AMERICA’S FOUNDATIONAL MYTH
FEEDS INEQUALITY, DISMANTLES THE MIDDLE CLASS, AND DEVOURS THE ELITE 55 (2019).
279. Logue, supra note 267, at 366 (“[C]ompetition induces tax advisors to compete to provide the
most aggressive, tax-minimizing interpretations of the tax laws possible.”); see also Michael J. Graetz,
Can a 20th Century Business Income Tax Regime Serve a 21st Century Economy, 30 AUSTRALIAN TAX
FORUM 551, 556 (2015) (noting the U.S. has recently faced “a new aggressiveness in tax minimization by
large business entities”).
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3. Circuit-breaking Tax Would Possibly Be Too Expensive
The likely impossibility of circuit-breaking tax reform should suffice
to counsel against requiring the government to pursue such reform as a
less restrictive alternative to union-strengthening laws. But a legislative
judgment that such reform would be unduly expensive could be a separate
ground for not demanding this alternative. Economists frequently argue
that progressive tax carries some trade-off with economic efficiency and
growth, although the magnitude of this trade-off for any given tax scheme
is hard to determine.280 Specifically, debates continue about the extent to
which progressively taxing income and wealth reduces entrepreneurship
and innovation, labor supply, the effort people commit to their jobs, and
people’s willingness to invest in obtaining education and training or
invest their money more generally.281
I take no position on whether the tradeoffs between progressive
taxation and any of these drivers of economic growth would render
circuit-breaking tax unduly expensive. One reason why I do not is that
there is also substantial research indicating that economic inequality itself
stunts economic growth.282 My limited point is that empirical debates
about tradeoffs between progressive taxation and economic growth could
provide grounds for a legislative judgment that circuit-breaking tax would
be unduly expensive. That judgment could warrant deference on either of
two grounds. First, it would constitute a predictive judgment because it
would predict aggregate responses of economic actors over time to tax
levels presumably much higher than the United States has yet imposed.283
To whatever extent tax levels may have been closer to circuit-breaking
many decades ago, changes in social and economic conditions since then
make it hard to predict the extent to which the effects of such tax levels
today would track the effects back then. Second, at least insofar as unionstrengthening laws receive only “exacting” scrutiny, such a legislative
finding could earn deference under precedents in which the Court, while
applying exacting scrutiny, deferred to legislative factual findings that
some studies support but others refute.284
Capital’s mobility across national and state borders further suggests
circuit-breaking tax reform could be unduly expensive. Recent decades
have brought conditions that enable people and firms to more easily move
280. E.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE
DEBATE OVER TAXES, 100, 115 (4th Ed. 2008).
281. Id.
282. Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 GEO.
L.J. ONLINE 1, 8–9 & n.9 (2015).
283. See supra Section III.A.4 (discussing deference to legislatures’ predictive judgments under
exacting and strict scrutiny).
284. Supra note 246.
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capital across international lines.285 These conditions impede progressive
taxation of personal and corporate income, because raising taxes on
income earned from capital—a source of income that the wealthy
disproportionately receive—incentivizes people and firms to “escape
taxation easily by shifting capital to low- or no-tax jurisdictions.”286 This
indicates that circuit-breaking tax reform might cause a degree of capital
flight that sufficiently stunts economic growth to support a legislative
prediction that such reform would be prohibitively expensive.
Capital mobility between states within the United States would be
relevant to assessing whether tax and transfer is a less restrictive
alternative to state-level union-strengthening laws. Much recent empirical
literature has detected a minimal relationship between state tax levels and
firms’ location decisions.287 But for two reasons this empirical literature
would not necessarily impugn a state legislature’s prediction that a
circuit-breaking tax regime would drive enough business into other states
as to render that regime unduly expensive. First, this literature
presumably288 has not observed firms’ responses to circuit-breaking tax
regimes. Second, for game theoretical reasons elaborated elsewhere,289
this literature does not even rule out the possibility that tax incentives
significantly influence firms’ location choices between states that subject
firms to tax levels below circuit-breaking.
Debates air too over the extent if any to which unions reduce economic
growth. My point is merely that, given tailoring analysis’s cost sensitivity,
a legislative judgment that circuit-breaking taxation could unduly impair
economic growth would counsel against requiring a legislature to pursue
such a regime as a less restrictive alternative to union-strengthening laws.
In sum, then, political feasibility concerns, and possibly cost concerns,
should bar deeming circuit-breaking tax to be a less restrictive alternative
to First Amendment-impinging union-strengthening laws. And efficacy
concerns likely bar deeming taxation short of circuit-breaking levels a less
restrictive alternative to such laws.

285. Graetz, supra note 279 (noting “a technological revolution” has allowed “information and
money, and in some cases products and services, to be moved around the world with the click of a
mouse”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (2000) (noting globalization has increased capital’s mobility).
286. Id. at 1576, 1625.
287. James R. Rogers, The Law and Policy of State Tax Competition: Much Ado About Nothing?,
4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 101–02 & n.1 (2006).
288. I write ‘presumably’ because I have not attempted to determine exactly what would constitute
a circuit-breaking tax regime.
289. Rogers, supra note 287, at 104–06.
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D. Over- and Under-inclusiveness and Proportionality
I do not address over-inclusiveness, because the over-inclusiveness
inquiry repeats the above necessity inquiry except for a consideration not
here relevant.290 For two reasons I do not discuss under-inclusiveness at
length. First, a government’s taking some, but not all possible, steps to
reduce wealth-based political inequality does not trigger the underinclusiveness inquiry’s first concern: the concern that the challenged state
action will be a futile strategy for advancing the state’s interest in
avoiding a given harm if the state action fails to regulate other conduct
that causes that harm.291 The harm caused by wealth-based political
inequality is one of degree: I assume courts would agree that governments
have a compelling interest in meaningfully reducing that inequality, even
if governments do not completely equalize political influence among
constituents. That latter goal, again, seems likely impossible.
Second, the government’s failing to pair union-strengthening laws with
maximal use of every other regulatory vehicle for reducing wealth-based
political inequality unlikely implicates the under-inclusiveness inquiry’s
second concern: that content- or viewpoint-based suppression of speech
was lawmakers’ real goal in enacting a challenged law.292 The political
feasibility and cost-efficacy considerations I discussed with respect to
circuit-breaking tax reform are more plausible reasons why governments
do not maximize those tools’ service for reducing this inequality.
I do not explicitly analyze proportionality, because the Court lacks
clear criteria for that analysis.293 But the political feasibility and costefficacy considerations that I discuss with respect to circuit-breaking tax
reform would bear on that analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court should recognize that our federal and state governments
have compelling interests in reducing economic inequality’s transmission
into political inequality (put differently, “wealth-based political
inequality”). Unions advance that interest in two overlapping ways: by
bolstering low-income and middle-class people’s political power to
influence public policy and by, both through that political power and
through collective bargaining, reducing economic inequality. Public
sector agency fees, which the Court recently held violate the First
Amendment, help unions advance this interest. So do other union290.
291.
292.
293.

Supra notes 180, 255 and accompanying text.
Id.
Fallon, supra note 40, at 1327.
Supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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strengthening laws that many people worry the Court now might hold also
impinge on the First Amendment.
Not only do these laws help reduce economic inequality’s transmission
into political inequality. They are also quite plausibly adequately tailored,
for First Amendment purposes, to that objective. Other scholarship
discusses how strong unions can be more effective at reducing that
transmission than are various strategies for safeguarding the political
process, including campaign finance restrictions and lobbying
restrictions. This Article focused instead on showing why replacing
strong unions with increased taxation would unlikely be as effective in
reducing wealth-based political inequality as would be a mixed regulatory
approach that relied on both strong unions and progressive taxation. The
root of why is that strong unions, unlike tax and transfer, both increase
economic equality and organize countervailing political power among
low-income and middle-class people. A circuit-breaking tax regime that
would effectively eliminate concern about wealth-based political
inequalities is likely impossible and could be undesirably expensive.
Absent a circuit-breaking tax regime, unions’ organization of
countervailing political power helps prevent the wealthy from, over time,
weakening or repealing progressive taxation. For that reason a mixed
regulatory approach can be more effective over time at reducing economic
inequality than an approach that replaces strong unions with increased
taxation. Even were a mixed regulatory approach not more effective over
time at reducing economic inequality, unions’ role in organizing
countervailing political power would likely make a mixed regulatory
approach more effective at reducing wealth-based political inequality.
Arguing that union-strengthening laws advance an interest in reducing
wealth-based political inequality could raise concerns that have caused
the Court to, in its campaign finance decisions, reject a compelling
interest in political equality. The core of those concerns was the Court’s
fear that judges lack tools to assess whether alleged inequalities in
political influence actually exist. But recent advances in social science
offer new tools for measuring wealth-based, as well as gender- and racebased, political inequality. These advances call for the Court to reassess
its aversion to recognizing a compelling interest in political equality.
Although this Article focused on unions’ role in advancing wealth-based
political equality, those social science tools and much of this Article’s
argument support additionally recognizing compelling interests in
advancing political equality along other dimensions, such as gender and
race.
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